30 Viet Cong battalions mass for Mekong Delta offensive
By Vera Kessler ·
Intelligence sources remain blacked out in notes to Richard Nixon detailing how 30 Viet Cong battalions threatened the Mekong Delta and Levi Eshkol fought a right-wing revolt.
A sanitized copy of "Late Notes for the President's Daily Brief of 11 February 1969," delivered to Richard Nixon on February 12, presents a world of stalled diplomacy and military anticipation. The document, sourced from the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, functions as a series of high-level updates on the Middle East, Vietnam, and East Asia, though it is punctuated by several "50X1" redactions that obscure specific intelligence sources or methods.
Eshkol and Newsweek
In the Middle East, the intelligence suggests a period of cautious waiting. The record notes that while India and Yugoslavia were pressing Egypt to resume diplomatic relations with the United States, Cairo remained hesitant. The sticking point was not a lack of pressure, but a specific expectation: a Cairo Foreign Office official told the Indian ambassador that Egypt was waiting for the "up-coming conversation between President Nixon and De Gaulle."
Simultaneously, the Israeli government was grappling with internal instability over the territories seized during the 1967 hostilities. The brief records that Prime Minister Levi Eshkol successfully defeated a no-confidence motion brought by right-wing critics. The friction stemmed from Eshkol's comments to Newsweek, in which he stated that Israel was not interested in holding on to areas of the West Bank that were "heavily Arab-populated."
While the CIA notes that Eshkol's statement did not actually reveal any Israeli "giveaway" on the territories, the motion itself served as a barometer for the domestic climate. The document observes that the right-wing push—with some demanding Israel hold all territories—highlighted the "touchiness of the territorial issue" and the political constraints Eshkol faced during an election year.
Mekong Delta Mortars
Turning to Vietnam, the tone shifts from diplomatic stalling to imminent military threat. The record identifies approximately "30-odd Viet Cong battalions" stationed in the Mekong Delta, which the agency assessed as being capable of making a "significant contribution" to a future Communist offensive.
Since the Tet offensive of 1968, the enemy command in the region had demonstrated an ability to coordinate corps-wide mortar attacks. The brief warns that the threat of major ground assaults had increased in the weeks leading up to the report, as "sizable enemy formations" shifted toward primary targets. Specifically, the CIA noted multi-battalion concentrations near urban centers such as My Tho in the northern delta and Can Tho further south.
Although allied sweep operations were reportedly spoiling some preparations—including the pushing back of two Viet Cong battalions from Can Tho by ARVN units—the situation remained volatile. In the 24 hours preceding the brief, Communist forces increased their pace of action, shelling urban centers and allied bases from Da Nang southward. The report explicitly mentions that four provincial capitals were hit by mortar and rocket fire, and an air base at Da Nang, along with bases in Tay Ninh Province, were among the "more significant military objectives struck."
Inept Planning
In East Asia, the documents track a shift in European recognition of China. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Harmel, planned to announce that Belgium recognized Peking as the government of "continental China," though the Belgians maintained they would continue to support Taiwan in the UN.
This diplomatic pivot occurred against a backdrop of desperation from Nationalist China. The record describes how the Nationalist defense ministry was once again attempting to organize "small-scale sabotage Operations" against the mainland. The agency's assessment of these efforts is blunt: the missions were generally "ineffective" due to "inept planning and the alertness of Chinese security forces."
There was a secondary concern that if any of these operations were launched from Hong Kong, Peking would hold the British government responsible and demand they prevent such activities. The document ends abruptly on this geopolitical tension, cutting off mid-sentence while discussing the role of another regional actor: "The Burmese have alwa"