Nixon eyes French bid to redraw Israeli and Arab borders
By Vera Kessler ·
North Vietnamese troops edge toward Saigon while diplomats offer lip service, as Nixon tracks French bids to redraw borders and 10 students storm the US embassy in Tokyo.
On the morning of February 3, 1969, the President's Daily Brief focused heavily on the frictions of French diplomacy and the linguistic stalemates of the Vietnam War. According to the OCR-extracted text from the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, the morning report for Richard Nixon was a study in the gap between official state positioning and the whispers heard in embassy hallways.
"Small rectifications in both directions"
The document begins with a report on Herve Alphand, then a top careerist in the French Foreign Ministry and former ambassador to the US. Alphand had informed the US Embassy in Paris that the Quai d'Orsay was developing specific proposals for a projected four-power meeting at the UN. The goal was to bring Israelis and Arabs together, though the text notes that the paper had not yet been approved by Georges Pompidou (then Prime Minister, though the document mentions "Debre" in relation to approvals) or Charles de Gaulle.
Alphand's proposal was characterized as being "much more precise than the Soviet plan." It centered on guarantees of frontiers and freedom of passage through the Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. Most telling, however, was the suggestion of "small rectifications of frontiers 'in both directions.'" It is a phrase of diplomatic delicacy, attempting to suggest a compromise on land that had been violently contested since the 1967 hostilities. The brief notes that Alphand hoped the US and the UK would arrive at the table with similarly specific proposals, suggesting a French desire to lead the diplomatic choreography in the region.
Xuan Thuy's lip service
Across the globe, the brief shifts to the Paris Peace Accords. The intelligence community was grappling with whether the North Vietnamese presentation from the previous Thursday contained any meaningful shifts in posture. The analysis is bleak. After reviewing previous Communist statements, the analysts found "almost nothing" new in the language of Xuan Thuy.
Thuy had repeatedly insisted that political issues must be clarified before military matters could be resolved. While this sounded like a prerequisite for peace, the brief notes that the Communists had used "almost the same language last July." The document describes Thuy’s mentions of "self-determination" as "lip service," a recurring theme used to demand that the US respect the Geneva agreements.
There was a slight shift in phrasing regarding the Liberation Front's "existence," moving away from the more restrictive demand that a settlement be "in accordance" with the Front's political program. The analysts assumed the Communists had abandoned the latter, "totally unacceptable" demand. However, the diplomatic refinement in Paris was contrasted with the reality on the ground: first-line Communist units were continuing to "edge closer to key allied target areas" in the provinces surrounding Saigon.
Windows in Tokyo
In the "Other Important Developments" section, the document records a moment of theatrical unrest. Ten Japanese students had invaded the US Embassy in Tokyo the previous afternoon. The brief dismisses this as an "attention-getting stunt." The students broke several windows and hung anti-US banners from the roof before the Japanese police evicted them. No offices were entered and no Americans were injured, but the incident served as a reminder of the volatility surrounding the US presence in Asia during the Nixon administration's first month.
Caldera and the Essequibo
In South America, the brief tracks the posture of President-elect Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. In a conversation with Ambassador Bernbaum, Caldera affirmed Venezuela's claim to the Essequibo region of Guyana. While he stated his government "would not resort to military force," he refused to repudiate those attempting to "foment rebellion" in the disputed territory.
Caldera further noted that large-scale economic projects in eastern Venezuela needed to expand into the disputed region. The analysts concluded that neither Caldera nor any other Venezuelan politician was "willing or able to defuse the dispute with Guyana," framing the territorial claim not as a diplomatic nuance but as a political necessity for any Venezuelan leader.
Finally, the document turns to Pakistan, where the brief predicts more turmoil. Leftist leaders and dissident students had rejected President Ayub Khan's offer of dialogue, demanding the withdrawal of troops from major cities. Ayub had suggested the 1962 constitution could be amended, but the intelligence community remained skeptical. The record leaves open the question of whether Ayub was actually prepared to abolish the indirect election system that virtually assured his re-election the following year.