Batista plans all-out measures to survive until February 1959
By Theo Marchetti ·
U.S. diplomats misjudged Fidel Castro as a mere figurehead, betting dictator Fulgencio Batista could hold power until February 1959 provided he avoided assassination.
On March 14, 1958, at 7 p.m., the U.S. Embassy in Havana sent a priority, secret telegram to the Department of State. The cable arrived at a moment when the Cuban government was facing a surge of internal pressure. Fulgencio Batista, the military officer and dictator who had dominated Cuban politics since the 1930s, had just informed the Ambassador that he was "confident can survive present crisis."
The Embassy, according to the record, was "inclined share his view." From the perspective of the diplomatic mission in Havana, the unrest was a product of "talk and agitation" and "small acts of terrorism and violence" rather than a coordinated movement capable of toppling the regime. The report cites sources within revolutionary groups who claimed that their action groups were "not ready," coordination was difficult, and no date had even been set for a general strike.
All-Out Measures
Despite the Embassy's optimism regarding the stability of the government, the telegram acknowledges a darker current in the street. The diplomatic staff noted that while a strike accompanied by violence remained a possibility, the motivation for many participants was "intimidation rather than personal conviction." This assessment suggested to the Embassy that the government's chances of success in handling the crisis were increased, as the opposition lacked a cohesive, voluntary base.
Batista, however, was not planning a diplomatic retreat or a softening of his stance. The telegram explicitly states that he had "no intention abdicate." Instead, he informed the Ambassador that he was "now preparing take all-out measures against Castro."
These "all-out measures" were directed at Fidel Castro, who the public record identifies as the leader of the 26 July movement. At the time, the U.S. Embassy viewed Castro not as the inevitable successor to Batista, but as a problematic figure who might not be able to hold a coalition together. The cable notes that Castro was "apparently regarded with antipathy by armed forces" and that his support among other revolutionary groups was based more on his role as a "figurehead than as personal leader."
The Figurehead
There is a striking gap between the Embassy's internal analysis of Castro's leadership and the historical reality that followed. The telegram claims that "reservations concerning him and reluctance follow him blindly" were noticeable even within his own movement. The Embassy's conclusion was that if Batista were removed, Castro would be an "important but probably not dominant factor political scene."
According to the report, the 26 July movement was expected to lose both "cohesiveness and momentum" once the common enemy—Batista—was gone. This suggests the U.S. mission believed the revolutionary impulse was reactive rather than ideological, fueled by the presence of the dictator rather than a viable alternative vision for Cuba.
February 1959
The telegram does not ignore the possibility of a sudden collapse, specifically focusing on the prospect of a political vacuum. The Embassy considered the scenario in which Batista were assassinated. In such an event, the report predicts that a "military junta would probably take control government," which might eventually merge into a combined military-civilian group.
Such a junta was viewed as a more stable or predictable outcome than a Castro-led government, as any new administration would be faced with the "serious problem of controlling Fidel Castro." The cable portrays the situation as one of "fluctuating tension" that would persist as long as Batista remained in the presidential palace.
Provided three conditions were met—the loyalty of the armed forces, the continued support of organized labor leadership, and the avoidance of assassination—the Embassy projected that Batista would "probably remain in control until end his term February 1959."
This forecast was based on the assumption that the internal contradictions of the revolutionary movement would prevent a successful coup. The record ends by noting that the situation changed daily and the appraisal was subject to modification. Batista did not make it to February; he resigned and fled Cuba in January 1959.