Castro seeks secret channel as NSC weighs 'Oswald business'

By Theo Marchetti · August 9, 2026

Intermediaries used a buffer to maintain a clandestine channel to Havana while Gordon Chase feared a link to Lee Harvey Oswald would trigger a political disaster.

Washington, December 2, 1963. The city is still reeling from the shock of the previous month, and the National Security Council is operating in a state of high tension. A memorandum from Gordon Chase to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, arrives on the desk. The subject is listed simply as "Bill Attwood Activities."

According to the record, published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (State Dept) volume on the Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, the document describes a clandestine attempt to maintain a line of communication with Havana during the immediate wake of the Kennedy assassination. It is a brief piece of correspondence, but it captures a moment of profound institutional hesitation.

Lisa Howard

The communication chain described in the memorandum is a circuitous one, typical of the back-channel diplomacy of the era. The process began when a man identified as Lechuga informed a woman named Lisa Howard that he had received a letter from Fidel Castro. This letter, according to the text, authorized Lechuga to engage in a discussion with Bill Attwood.

Lechuga’s primary concern, as relayed through Howard, was whether the geopolitical landscape had shifted in a way that rendered the outreach obsolete. When asked if things were still the same, Miss Howard replied that she "didn’t know anything." She later passed this information along to Attwood. In the world of sensitive government contacts, Howard served as the essential, if temporary, buffer between the American intermediary and the Cuban representative.

A Lunch in Washington

On December 2, the day the memorandum was written, the circuit shortened. Bill Attwood ran into Lechuga at lunch. The record describes the encounter as happening "by accident." After the exchange of condolences regarding the death of the President, Attwood brought up the letter. He informed Lechuga that Lisa Howard had told him about the authorization for talks.

Lechuga confirmed the authorization. Notably, during this face-to-face meeting, Lechuga did not explicitly mention that the letter had come from Castro, though he had previously made that clear to Miss Howard. The two men discussed the current status of affairs, and Attwood told Lechuga he would let him know how the U.S. side viewed the situation. By the end of the meal, the intermediaries had streamlined their operation; they agreed that there was "no further need to use Lisa Howard as an intermediary."

The Oswald Business

For the NSC, the timing of this outreach was the primary complication. The memorandum notes that Bill Attwood was unsure if Castro had penned the letter before or after the assassination of President Kennedy. However, the fact remained that Lechuga had received no "stop-order" from Havana since the event. Chase observes that one might assume the assassination had not changed Castro’s mind about speaking with the United States.

Inside the NSC, the reaction was split. Attwood believed that the U.S. had "nothing to lose in listening to what Castro has to say," arguing that listening did not constitute a commitment. Gordon Chase shared this curiosity. In a moment of candor that breaks through the usual sterile tone of such memos, Chase writes, "I am also dying to know what’s in the letter."

Two weeks prior, Chase admits he would not have hesitated to pursue the lead. But by December 2, the atmosphere had curdled. He tells Bundy that "things are different now, particularly with this Oswald business." The reference to Lee Harvey Oswald suggests that the NSC was acutely aware of the potential for the assassination to be linked to Cuba, or at least the volatility that such a link would trigger in public opinion and foreign policy.

Chase concludes that any such conversation would have to be a "non-event" to avoid political fallout. He urges Bundy to think the matter over carefully.

While the National Archives hold broader "Immigration and Private Bill Case Files" regarding individuals named Attwood, and the NSArchive maintains various chronicles on Russian cyber warfare and information operations, this specific memorandum remains a snapshot of a precarious window in 1963. It captures the tension between the desire for intelligence and the fear of a political disaster.

The memorandum ends without a directive. It leaves the situation in a state of suspension, noting only that "the ball is in our court" and that Bill Attwood owes Lechuga a call.