CIA officer passed Black Leaf 40 poison pen to kill Castro as JFK was shot
By Theo Marchetti ·
Presidential oversight bodies were deceived about a plot to kill Fidel Castro while CIA agents paid Rolando Cubela $8,200 for an assassination attempt.
A CIA officer was passing an assassination weapon—a ballpoint pen rigged with a hypodermic needle containing Black Leaf 40 poison—to a Cuban asset at the very hour that President John F. Kennedy was shot.
This detail is preserved in an editorial note from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), a State Department publication. The note summarizes a 133-page report authored by the CIA Inspector General, J.S. Earman, and transmitted in installments beginning April 24, 1967, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms. The subject was Project AMLASH, a program designed to facilitate the assassination of Fidel Castro through a relationship with Major Rolando Cubela.
A Ballpoint Pen and Black Leaf 40
Rolando Cubela Secades was not a typical exile. According to the Inspector General's report, he was the second-ranking leader of the Directorio Revolucionario 13 de Marzo, an elite group of leftist students who had organized violence to overthrow the Batista regime in 1956. Though initially close to Castro, Cubela became disenchanted. When the CIA first made contact with him in Mexico City in March 1961, Cubela insisted that the only way to overthrow the Cuban regime was the "elimination of Castro himself."
The poison pen was the first attempt. When that failed, the operation shifted toward conventional weaponry. Cubela attempted to obtain a silencer for a Belgian FAL submachine gun, but the record notes the CIA was "unable to produce one in time to be included in an arms cache drop."
By December 1964, the Agency's direct involvement reached a turning point. In Paris on December 6 and 7, the CIA informed Cubela that the United States could no longer be involved in the attempted assassination and that he would have to seek help elsewhere. However, the record indicates the Agency did not truly sever the tie; instead, it engineered a meeting between Cubela and Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime. The intent was to hide the CIA's hand. The report states that the Agency wanted Artime to provide the silenced weapon that the CIA was "unwilling to furnish to him directly."
303 Committee Minutes
There is a stark discrepancy between the activities described in the Inspector General's report and the official records of the administration's oversight bodies. The FRUS editorial note points to the records of the Special Group (also known as the 303 Committee) for the Johnson administration. These records show no consideration, authorization, or involvement in any plot to assassinate Castro.
In meetings on June 18 and July 30, 1964, the focus was not on executing a plot, but on preventing one. CIA Director John McCone and McGeorge Bundy discussed rumors of Cuban émigré plots. McCone expressed skepticism about these reports, and the group decided that Bundy would alert Attorney General Robert Kennedy to use law enforcement to prevent such plans. An FBI investigation subsequently dismissed those exile plans, a finding that McCone relayed to Bundy in August 1964.
Even as late as January 7, 1965, the minutes of the 303 Committee describe Rolando Cubela merely as "a representative of an internal military dissident group, which is plotting to overthrow Castro." The committee members asked a simple, descriptive question: "What sort of man is Cubela?"
Madrid and Manuel Artime
The disconnect between the field and the committee room creates a gap in the historical record. While the 303 Committee was discussing law enforcement and asking biographical questions about Cubela, the CIA was coordinating logistics in Europe.
Following the engineered introduction, Artime and Cubela met in Madrid on December 27 and 30, 1964. Artime agreed to provide the silencer. By February 1965, Cubela met Artime again in Madrid and reportedly received a Belgian FAL rifle with a silencer and a pistol with a silencer. During that same month, Cubela requested and received $8,200 from several CIA officers for emergency travel expenses.
This clandestine arrangement lasted until June 25, 1965, when CIA headquarters sent a cable ordering the termination of all contact with the Cubela group. The cable cited "convincing proof that entire AMLASH group insecure" and warned that further contact constituted a "menace to CIA operations against Cuba as well as to security of CIA Staff personnel in Western Europe."
When the Senate Select Committee later questioned Richard Helms about whether President Johnson had been informed that assassination efforts continued into his presidency, Helms replied: "I just canʼt answer that, I just donʼt know. I canʼt recall having done so."\ He suggested that the Special Group would have reported such matters to the President, as was "the usual practice," yet the Special Group records remain silent on the matter.
In March 1966, the operation ended in a Cuban prison. Rolando Cubela was arrested by Cuban security police and confessed his guilt. Despite the nature of the plot, Fidel Castro requested that the death penalty not be imposed. Cubela was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment.