State Department plotted to kill Fidel, Raul and Che simultaneously

By Desmond Okafor · August 9, 2026

To avoid creating an untouchable icon, U.S. planners sought to besmirch Fidel Castro's character and kill the Cuban leadership in a coordinated strike.

“What Would Happen If Castro Died?”

That is the question posed in a memorandum dated October 6, 1961, addressed to Park F. Wollam. The document, found in the Foreign Relations of the United States (State Dept) archives, begins with a gap—a name and a block of text that remain not declassified—before diving into a cold-blooded cost-benefit analysis of the death of the Cuban leader.

For the authors of the memo, the prospect of Fidel Castro's demise was not a cause for immediate celebration. While Washington may have hoped for a spontaneous eruption of democratic fervor, the record admits such a hope would be “wishful thinking.” The document acknowledges that by late 1961, the government had made “tremendous strides” in organizing Cuba into a “complete police state.” In the eyes of the State Department, the internal machinery of the revolution was too robust for a simple vacancy at the top to trigger a liberation.

"Great White Father"

The memorandum provides a revealing glimpse into how the U.S. viewed Castro’s hold over the Cuban populace. It describes him not merely as a political leader, but as a psychological anchor for the urban and rural poor. The record claims the poor looked to him as a kind of “Great White Father,” a symbol of invocation for those seeking to right historical wrongs.

More critically, the memo notes that Castro’s public persona acted as a shield for the state's more brutal elements. According to the text, “Fidel’s voice is what covers the naked power of the repressive organs and can still appeal.” The authors argue that while the people associated the “evils” of the regime with his subordinates, Castro remained the “last court of appeal.” This suggests a strategic dilemma for the United States: as long as the man lived, he was a target; if he died, he risked becoming an untouchable icon.

Raul Castro

If the “Great White Father” were removed, the State Department looked to a short list of successors: Raul Castro, “Che” Guevara, Nunez Jimenez, and Faure Chomon. Raul Castro, then Minister of Armed Forces and Vice-President, was viewed as the primary heir. The memo notes that his power as Minister of the Armed Forces ranked him “second only to the Prime Minister.”

Ernesto “Che” Guevara was dismissed as a likely candidate for top leadership, with the record stating it was “felt that Ernest ‘Che’ Guevara would not be acceptable to the Cuban people as he is not Cuban born.” While the U.S. acknowledged Guevara would likely wield “tremendous power,” they did not see him as the ranking authority. The analysis concludes that no one on the list possessed the “personal magnetism or popular support” of Fidel, but it concedes that together, Raul, Guevara, and the top Communists held a level of control that no opposition leader could match.

October 6, 1961

Because of the risk of martyrdom, the memorandum argues that the manner of Castro’s death was more important than the death itself. To avoid creating a symbol for the “radical left of Latin America,” the authors suggest that Castro must not be allowed to die as a hero. Instead, the record asserts that he must either “die ignominiously and in a situation that will contribute to besmirching his character” or be “eliminated by the Russians” as a liability.

This calculation reveals a preference for character assassination to accompany the physical act. The goal was to ensure that the conditions surrounding his death “publically and irrefutably” destroyed the last vestiges of regard he held within Cuba. Only by stripping the man of his dignity, the memo suggests, could the U.S. effectively undercut the image of the “Revolution.”

Batista’s Ex-Constitutional Army

The document does not stop at the death of one man. It explores the possibility of a broader collapse, noting that any successful uprising would likely require the involvement of the right-wing movement under FRIO. This group’s plans involved the use of a “re-activated BATISTA army,” which the record refers to as the “Ex-Constitutional Army.”

This force reportedly consisted of upwards of 5,000 men for combat, alongside the CIC in Exile led by Eusebio Mujal. However, the State Department's own analysis warns that the return of this specific group to power would likely lead to an “early renewal of civil war” and an “eventual return to power of the Communists.”

Ultimately, the memorandum concludes that targeting Fidel Castro alone would be insufficient. To create enough “chaos” to allow for an overthrow, the document argues that an assassination program would have to be targeted simultaneously against “Fidel and Raul Castro, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, and several other key Communists.” This program, the record suggests, would need to be coordinated with an organized resistance movement to provide a simultaneous internal uprising.