7 Million Face Starvation as Soviets Send 25 Jets to Nigeria
By Vera Kessler ·
Seven million people face probable starvation and feared racial extermination in a shrunken perimeter while Washington's neutrality allows Moscow to arm the federal government.
The President's Daily Brief from 24 January 1969 presents a world held in a series of precarious balances. From the soybean markets of Belgium to the missile sites of the USSR, the document records a moment where the superpowers were less concerned with total victory than with the management of stalemate.
25 Jet Fighter Aircraft
The most extensive portion of the brief, an annex on Nigeria, captures a geopolitical gamble. The Nigerian civil war had reached a four-month stalemate around the "shrunken Biafran perimeter." The US found itself in a strategic vacuum, attempting to support the principle of Nigerian unity while refusing to issue permits for arms sales to the federal government in Lagos. This neutrality, the record notes, drew the "opprobrium of both sides in the struggle."
While Washington hesitated, the Soviet Union positioned itself as "Nigeria's friend in need." The Soviets provided significant military hardware, including "some 25 jet fighter aircraft," and installed a military attaché in Lagos in November. The federal leader, Gowon, had traditionally preferred Western sources, but the brevity and reliability of Soviet supplies gave Moscow an opening. The record suggests that as the military deadlock continued, the US and UK were actively losing ground to the USSR.
On the ground, the human cost was staggering. The brief describes an Ibo exodus that crammed "some 7 million people into approximately 7,500 square miles." Starvation was listed as a probable outcome for the coming months. The US attempted to mitigate this by providing aircraft to relief agencies, a move that Gowon viewed with suspicion, warning the US ambassador that such aid could have "serious consequences" for bilateral relations. The federal government feared that humanitarian relief was a cover for support of the Biafrans, who believed they faced "racial extermination" if they lost.
Gunnar Jarring in Moscow
In the Middle East, the brief tracks the anxieties of Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish diplomat and Turkologist tasked with mediating the aftermath of the 1967 hostilities. Jarring was "obviously worried" about the potential for "great power consultations" proposed by France, fearing such talks would sideline his mission.
According to a US Embassy officer in Moscow, the Soviets had reassured Jarring that they wanted his mission to continue. Jarring had planned to renew individual talks with the Arab foreign ministers and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in mid-February, but the record indicates that the prospect of great power talks might cause "further slippage" in those plans. This tension between the UN's mediating role and the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council is mirrored in the concerns of Secretary-General U Thant, who urged Ambassador Yost that any four-power talks should occur "explicitly as permanent members of the Security Council."
Who Controls the Populace?
In Czechoslovakia, the brief monitors the aftermath of the Prague Spring with a cold, clinical eye. The city was preparing for the funeral of Jan Palach, the student who had committed self-immolation in protest of the Soviet occupation. The record describes "silent thousands filing by the coffin" beneath a statue of Jan Hus.
The stability of the regime was fragile. The brief notes that a seventh young man had set himself on fire just the day before. While there was "apparently no truth to rumors" that substantial Soviet forces were moving back into the city center, the atmosphere remained volatile. Alexander Dubcek appealed for law and order, a plea seconded by student leaders who warned of provocations. However, the document concludes that neither Dubcek nor the students "could guarantee to control the populace."
This fragility in the satellite states was countered by a hard-line buildup of hardware. The brief reports that more than 75 new SA-3 low-altitude surface-to-air missile sites had been built in the USSR and Eastern Europe since mid-1967. Intelligence analysts suspected this resumption of deployment followed an examination of US fighter-bomber tactics in Vietnam.
January 24, 1969
Across other theaters, the brief records a series of tactical shifts. In Peru, moderates led by Prime Minister Montagne were weighing whether to keep President Velasco in office for a few months to absorb the fallout from the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company. In South Korea, President Pak's supporters were plotting to eliminate the constitutional barrier to a third term, planning a national referendum for August—a date chosen specifically because "potentially volatile students are dispersed on vacation."
Finally, the brief points toward an upcoming international conference in East Berlin, scheduled for 28 through 31 January. Whether this was a meeting of the Warsaw Pact political leaders or the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), the document predicts the discussions would center on "steps to re-establish unity under Moscow's leadership."