Castro dismantled Cuba's government in just 24 hours
By Roy Castellano ·
Manuel Urrutia was branded a traitor and ousted without a defense while U.S. officials watched Castro become the undisputed master of the island, barring accidents or assassination.
Havana, July 18, 1959—2 p.m. In the span of twenty-four hours, the political landscape of Cuba was dismantled and reassembled. A telegram sent from the U.S. Embassy in Havana to the Department of State records a whirlwind of resignations and appointments: Fidel Castro resigned, denounced President Manuel Urrutia, oversaw Urrutia’s own resignation, watched the election of Dorticos as the new president, and then promptly resumed his position as Prime Minister.
For the observers at the embassy, this was not merely a shuffle of titles. It was a demonstration of efficiency. The author of the cable, identified as Bonsal, describes the removal of Urrutia—an "uncooperative associate"—as a "complete success" in terms of political maneuver.
24 Hours in Havana
The speed of the transition was matched by the violence of the rhetoric. Castro did not simply ask Urrutia to step aside; he destroyed him. According to the telegram, Castro pinned accusations of "moral, civic, and revolutionary shortcomings that bordered on treason" on the president. The record notes that Urrutia was given "no opportunity to defend himself against such charges."
Despite the brutality of the process, the embassy noted that Castro’s actions were "overwhelmingly endorsed" by various sectors of the Cuban population. To Washington, the result was clear: Castro had emerged from the affair strengthened by a "new overwhelming mandate." Bonsal writes that Castro was the "undisputed master of Cuba today" and likely would remain so for the foreseeable future.
"Insolent espionage"
The telegram suggests that the internal purge was happening against a backdrop of mounting friction with the United States. Castro was, according to the record, "still smarting" over Senate questioning regarding Diaz Lanz. He did not mince words in his denunciation speech, characterizing the U.S. Senate hearings as acts of "gangsters" and accusing the American government of engaging in "insolent espionage" against Cuba and intervening in its internal affairs.
This friction extended to the very definition of the revolution. The embassy cable highlights a paradox in Castro's positioning. On one hand, Castro appeared "more definitely committed than ever" to a public position of "non-persecution of communists," quoting his own previous pronouncements to make the point. On the other hand, he exhibited what Bonsal calls a "almost pathological resentment" toward any suggestion that communism actually existed within the Cuban government. Castro dismissed such implications as "efforts to ‘blackmail’ him" and as "infamous calumny."
Accidents or assassination
From the perspective of the State Department, the primary concern was the ability to steer Cuba toward a "general anti-communist orientation." While the telegram notes an absence of anti-American expressions outside of the Diaz Lanz episode—which gave the embassy some hope that Castro wanted to avoid "unnecessary difficulties"—the overall outlook was bleak. The record admits it would be "even more difficult henceforth to influence him."
The most chilling line in the communication appears when Bonsal assesses Castro's grip on power. He notes that Castro is the undisputed master of the island, "barring accidents or assassination."
This casual mention of assassination reflects the cold calculus of the era, where the stability of a foreign government was weighed against the viability of clandestine removal. It frames the U.S. relationship with the young revolutionary government not as a diplomatic partnership, but as a struggle for leverage. The embassy observed that while Castro proclaimed an "intransigent nationalism," he remained extremely sensitive to how he was perceived abroad.
While this specific telegram provides a snapshot of a single July day in 1959, the broader machinery of U.S. surveillance and intervention is evident in the wider archives. The U.S. National Archives hold extensive "Records Related to Fidel Castro" (NAID 636750) and various "Correspondence and Publications" (NAID 638282) that track this trajectory. Other files, such as the State Department's FRUS volumes for 1958–1960, and CIA Reading Room entries including a "Central Intelligence Bulletin" from June 20, 1959, provide the surrounding context for this period of instability.
Bonsal closes the telegram by noting a final curiosity: the tension between Castro's sensitivity to foreign reaction and his public commitment to a sovereign, nationalist path. The record leaves the question of American influence hanging, noting only that Castro would likely be "extremely reluctant" to take any positive action that would be interpreted as increasing communist influence.