Curtis LeMay Ordered Up to 28 Air Sorties to Pressure North Vietnamese Routes

By Harlan Pryce · August 9, 2026

Laotian neutrality remained a fragile fiction while the US targeted infiltration routes to coerce the DRV using graduated pressure.

Route 23. Route 9. Route 7. In the geography of the secret war in Laos, these numbers were not merely roads but conduits for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and targets for American ordnance.

A memorandum dated December 17, 1964, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, details the operational specifics of what the military termed a "controlled program of graduated pressures." The document, JCSM–1050–64, found in the Foreign Relations of the United States (State Dept) archive, serves as a blueprint for the second week of a campaign designed to harass DRV infiltration routes and facilities.

By December 1964, the United States was attempting to calibrate its escalation in Southeast Asia. The memorandum refers back to a first week of operations—two missions presented in an earlier document, JCSM–1041–64—which had been approved on December 12. The Joint Chiefs were not satisfied with the initial tempo. They argued that to achieve the desired effect, "some relaxation in the existing guidance" was necessary to allow for more aircraft and more frequent coverage of the routes.

"Graduated Pressures"

The JCS plan for the second week was precise. It called for "armed route reconnaissance," a euphemism for air strikes where pilots looked for targets of opportunity along a designated path. For Route 23, between its junction with Route 12 and the southern limit of the Pathet Lao controlled area, the plan called for six to eight aircraft sorties. If the pilots finished their reconnaissance without spending their bombs, they were directed toward a secondary target: "Tchepone barracks (RLAF Target No. 3)."

Route 9 was treated similarly, with another six to eight sorties between the Republic of Vietnam border and the junction with Route 23 at Ban Yang. Again, a secondary target was provided: "Tchepone military area (RLAF Target No. 4)."

The scale increased when the plan turned to Route 7, the primary artery from the DRV leading into the Plaine des Jarres. Here, the Joint Chiefs recommended 12 aircraft sorties. The secondary target was the "Nong Het supply area."

This focus on Route 7 was not merely a military preference. The memorandum notes that Prime Minister Souvanna, the leader of the neutralist government in Vientiane, had "frequently asked that the United States interdict this route." This request highlights the fragile fiction of Laotian neutrality. While the public record, including the general history of the region, notes that Laos was officially neutral under the 1962 Geneva Accords, the operational reality was a landscape of American air power and CIA-funded logistics.

Route 7 and the Plaine des Jarres

While the JCS memorandum focuses on military aircraft, the broader operational environment in Laos relied heavily on the covert support of Air America. Established by the CIA, the airline's slogan, "Anything, Anywhere, Anytime, Professionally," mirrored the flexible, if opaque, requirements of the war. While the JCS managed the "armed reconnaissance" of the routes, Air America managed the shadows—supplying irregular forces and maintaining the logistics that allowed the war to persist without a formal US ground presence.

The Joint Chiefs also planned to repeat the first week's reconnaissance of Routes 8, 121, and 12. The secondary targets for these flights included the Ban Thay military area and the Ban Kha Dap military camp. The logic was one of attrition and interruption, designed to squeeze the DRV's ability to move men and material southward.

State Department, 10 a.m.

The memorandum was written in anticipation of an interdepartmental meeting scheduled for Saturday, December 19, 1964, at 10 a.m. in the Department of State. The attendee list, provided in the archival footnotes, reads like a directory of the era's foreign policy establishment: William Bundy (chairman), McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Cooper, McCone, Vance, McNaughton, Mustin, and MacDonald.

Though the memorandum focused on the specifics of Laotian air strikes, the footnote observes that "Vietnam comprised the bulk of the discussion" during that meeting. The strikes in Laos were a subset of a larger, more volatile strategy. The graduation of pressure was a gamble—the belief that the DRV could be coerced into changing its behavior through a carefully measured increase in pain.

The document was signed for the Joint Chiefs by Curtis E. LeMay, Acting Chairman. LeMay, a proponent of decisive air power, was the primary architect of this operational push. He ensured that the Commander in Chief, Pacific, was alerted that these missions were under consideration and that he should be prepared to execute them.

According to the archival record, a map was attached to the original memorandum to illustrate the routes and targets, but it was not printed in the published volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States.