Persian Agent Fooled Nazi Abwehr in Secret Soviet Collaboration

By Harlan Pryce · August 9, 2026

German intelligence was fed curated misinformation through a Persian radio link managed by the British in a high-stakes collaboration with Soviet agents.

KISS: Persian.

That is how the file begins. The catalogue entry for reference KV 2/1281 in the UK National Archives records the existence of a Persian double agent who operated during the Second World War. In the world of clandestine operations, a "Double Cross" agent is a piece of high-stakes tradecraft: an asset who ostensibly serves one intelligence service while actually working for another. In this instance, the asset known as KISS maintained a radio link with the Abwehr—the military intelligence organization of Nazi Germany—which was eventually taken over by Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME).

Taking over a radio link is a delicate procedure. It requires not just the capture of the hardware and the codes, but the maintenance of the illusion that the agent is still operating under the original control. If the Abwehr sensed the shift, the link would be burned, and the asset would be discarded or executed. When SIME assumed control of KISS, they inherited a direct line into the German intelligence apparatus, turning a potential leak into a controlled valve for misinformation.

KV 2/1281

The file is situated within the Security Service's Personal (PF Series) Files, specifically under the umbrella of World War II Double Agent Operations. To understand the weight of such a file, one must look at the company it keeps. The same catalogue search brings up KV 2/40, the records of Juan Pujol García, the agent codenamed GARBO. García is the gold standard of the Double Cross system, having created a fictional network of sub-agents that fooled the German High Command about the location of the D-Day landings.

KISS may not have the name recognition of GARBO, but the technical requirements of his operation—specifically the radio link—suggest a level of tactical utility. Radio traffic is a physical thing; it can be traced, intercepted, and analyzed. For SIME to manage this link meant they were not just managing a man, but managing a signal. They had to ensure the "fist"—the unique rhythmic style of the radio operator—remained consistent enough to deceive the Abwehr’s monitors.

Security Intelligence Middle East

The involvement of SIME indicates the geographic and strategic importance of the Persian theater during the war. Iran was a vital corridor for Lend-Lease supplies moving toward the Soviet Union, and the competition for influence in the region was fierce. The Abwehr sought to exploit any instability or local grievance to disrupt these supply lines. By turning KISS, the British ensured that the intelligence the Germans believed they were receiving from Persia was, in fact, curated by the Security Service.

This operation was not a rogue effort. The catalogue references the broader administrative framework that governed these assets. Files KV 4/65 and KV 4/69 detail the formation and minutes of the Twenty Committee, the body responsible for the overall coordination of the Double Cross system. Furthermore, KV 4/70 references the "W" Board, another layer of the policy-making apparatus that ensured double agents were not accidentally compromised by other branches of the British government.

Collaboration with Soviet Intelligence

Where the case of KISS becomes truly "notable," according to the catalogue entry, is in its intersection with the East. The record states that for a time, the case "involved collaboration with Soviet Intelligence."

In the context of the 1940s, "collaboration" is a polite word for a marriage of convenience between entities that fundamentally distrusted one another. The British and the Soviets were allies against Hitler, but they were competitors in every other sense. For a double agent to be shared, or for his operations to be coordinated with the NKVD or GRU, required a level of trust that was almost non-existent in the field. It suggests that the intelligence KISS was providing, or the deception he was facilitating, was of such high value that the Security Service was willing to let the Soviets in on the secret.

Such arrangements are rarely stable. When a third party enters a double-agent operation, the risk of a "triple cross" increases exponentially. One has to wonder who was actually directing the traffic and who was merely observing. The catalogue entry does not specify the nature of this collaboration—whether the Soviets were providing the asset, helping to manage him, or simply receiving a filtered stream of his reports.

Outside of this specific record, other archives hold references to individuals named Kiss, including the "Elek Kiss Papers" and the papers of a later anti-nuclear activist named Charlie Kiss in the UK National Archives, as well as files in the US National Archives and the Internet Archive. However, the Persian agent KISS remains a distinct figure of the WWII era, a ghost in the machinery of the Double Cross system.

The catalogue entry leaves the specifics of the Soviet collaboration and the eventual fate of the radio link to the pages of the PF Series files.