Abwehr Recruit Betrays Germany to Feed High Command Lies
By Constance Bell ·
German high command believed a sleeper agent had penetrated Iceland, while the British Security Service used a turned recruit's radio link to feed the Abwehr curated misinformation.
The journey began in Copenhagen, continued through a training regimen in Hamburg, and ended in the cold waters of the North Atlantic. According to a catalogue entry from The National Archives (UK) under reference KV 2/1137, an individual codenamed COBWEB was recruited by the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, and prepared for a mission in Iceland. He was given an intelligence brief and despatched to the island via submarine.
For the Abwehr, the deployment of an agent by submarine was a high-stakes investment in logistics and secrecy. It required precise coordination between the intelligence wing and the Kriegsmarine to insert a sleeper or a scout into a strategic location. But as soon as COBWEB stepped off the vessel, the investment collapsed. The file's catalogue entry records that "on arrival he took the first opportunity to report his recruitment to the authorities."
Copenhagen and Hamburg
There is a specific kind of vulnerability in the transition from recruit to operative. COBWEB was moved through the gears of the German intelligence apparatus—recruited in the Danish capital, refined in the training centers of Hamburg—only to pivot the moment he reached his destination. The catalogue entry does not provide COBWEB's real name or the specific dates of his transit, but it outlines a trajectory of immediate betrayal.
In the lexicon of archaic English, there is a word, atter, used to describe poisonous bodily fluid or the vile, corrupt substance of a wound. In the world of intelligence, a turned agent is a form of atter introduced into the enemy's bloodstream. By reporting himself immediately, COBWEB ceased to be a tool for the Abwehr and became a conduit for the British Security Service. The record states he was "turned into a double agent and his radio link used for deception purposes."
A Radio Link for Deception
The value of a double agent is rarely found in the secrets they bring, but in the lies they are permitted to send back. For the Security Service, COBWEB was not merely a defector; he was a secure channel. The "radio link" mentioned in KV 2/1137 allowed the British to feed the Abwehr curated misinformation, ensuring that the German high command believed they had a functioning ear on the ground in Iceland while they were actually hearing whatever the Security Service wanted them to hear.
This operation sat within a broader framework of strategic lying. Related catalogue entries in the KV series suggest that the British were managing multiple layers of deceit during this period. Files KV 4/430 and KV 4/429 describe "policy and procedure regarding channels for deception other than special agents," focusing on the "spreading of false" information through means that bypassed the double-cross system of turned operatives entirely.
While some deception was systemic and impersonal, other operations relied on the prestige of a single, highly effective liar. The same archive contains extensive records on Juan Pujol Garcia, known by the codename GARBO (KV 2/67, KV 2/66, and KV 2/63). Garcia’s files consist of copies of communications by letter and wireless telegraphy (WT) with the Germans, incorporating British deception material. COBWEB was a smaller gear in the same machine, a tactical asset used to maintain the illusion of German penetration in the North Atlantic.
Beyond the Double-Cross System
What remains in the catalogue description is the skeleton of a mission. We have the route—Copenhagen, Hamburg, Iceland—and the outcome—betrayal and the establishment of a deception link. We do not have the content of the "intelligence brief" COBWEB was given in Hamburg, nor do we have the transcripts of the messages he sent back to his handlers in the Abwehr.
There is a gap between the archival summary and the human experience of the man behind the codename. The record does not say if COBWEB acted out of ideology, fear, or a calculated desire for a payout from the British. It only notes the mechanical result: the radio link was active, the deception was in place, and the Abwehr was operating on a falsehood.
Other archival collections, such as those held by the NSArchive, continue to track the evolution of threat landscapes in the transport sector and the cyber strategies of Nordic nations like Denmark and Iceland. These modern files deal with digital signals and infrastructure, a far cry from the diesel fumes of a submarine and the crackle of a shortwave radio. Yet the fundamental logic remains the same: the control of the channel is more important than the message itself.
The catalogue entry for KV 2/1137 leaves the story of COBWEB suspended at the moment of his utility. It tells us he was turned and used, but it does not record when his radio link went silent or how the Abwehr eventually discovered they had been talking to a ghost.