British intelligence harvested a surrendered soldier's identity to trick the Abwehr
By Harlan Pryce ·
While Edward Harry Bernard Durrant sat in detention, the Security Service kept his correspondence open to whisper state-sponsored falsehoods to the Abwehr.
In 1939, a former soldier walked into an office in Cairo and surrendered. He did not offer a battle plan or a list of assets; he offered himself. He told the authorities that he had been recruited by German Intelligence and deployed to Egypt for a specific, clinical purpose: to gather information on military matters.
This is the starting point of the file's catalogue entry for Edward Harry Bernard Durrant, held at the UK National Archives under reference KV 2/3760. The record is part of the Security Service's "Personal (PF Series) Files," a collection that categorizes human lives as either "German Intelligence Agents" or "Suspected Agents." In the eyes of the state, Durrant was no longer a soldier or a citizen; he was a data point in a war of signals.
Cairo, 1939
The catalogue entry for KV 2/3760 is brief, but it captures a moment of profound vulnerability. Durrant "volunteered to the authorities," a phrase that suggests a sudden break with his handlers or a collapse of nerve. Whether he was driven by a crisis of conscience or a calculation of survival, the result was immediate. He was removed from the field in Egypt and returned to the United Kingdom, where he was placed in detention.
For most, detention is the end of the story—the point where the individual is neutralized and the threat is extinguished. But for the Security Service, Durrant's value did not vanish when he was locked away. The government saw something in the wreckage of his betrayal that was more useful than the man himself: the connection. While Durrant sat in a cell, the British intelligence apparatus began a different kind of operation.
"For Deception Purposes"
The file's catalogue entry records that "in his absence there was an attempt to keep the correspondence link with Germany open for deception purposes."
This is the cold logic of the intelligence state. The human asset—the man who had actually walked the streets of Cairo and reported to the Germans—was irrelevant. What mattered was the channel. By maintaining the correspondence, the Security Service could feed the German Intelligence Service a curated reality. They could whisper lies into the ear of the Abwehr using a voice the Germans already trusted.
Durrant became a ghost. He was the signature on letters he likely never saw, the identity behind reports he no longer wrote. He was detained, yet his ghost was still working for the Crown, operating as a conduit for state-sponsored falsehoods. The state didn't just punish the spy; it harvested his identity to turn the enemy's own machinery against them.
KV 4/429 and the False Signal
To understand where Durrant fit into the broader strategy of the era, one must look at the surrounding archives. The Security Service was running a massive, sophisticated game of mirrors known as the Double Cross system. Related files in the KV series show the scale of this effort. Files KV 2/63, 64, 66, and 67 detail the operations of Juan Pujol Garcia, codename GARBO, a man who became one of the most successful double agents in history, flooding the Germans with British deception material.
However, the Durrant case suggests a different tactical lane. Catalogue reference KV 4/429 describes "policy and procedure regarding channels for deception other than special agents." According to that file's description, these papers deal with the deception of German Intelligence "by means other than the double-cross system of 'turned' double agents," specifically through the "spreading of false" information.
There is a distinct difference between a "turned" agent like GARBO—who actively collaborated with the British to deceive the Germans—and a detained soldier like Durrant, whose abandoned link was simply kept open. Durrant was not a partner in the deception; he was the catalyst for it. He provided the bridge, and then the British burned it behind him while continuing to send traffic across it.
This approach reflects a particular cynicism in the Security Service's methodology. The goal was not necessarily to flip the agent's loyalty, but to exploit the vacuum left by their disappearance. It is a strategy of opportunistic vacancy.
We are left with the gaps in the catalogue. The entry for KV 2/3760 tells us that Durrant was detained and that his correspondence link was exploited. It does not say how long he remained in detention, whether he was ever charged in a court of law, or if he ever knew that his identity was being used to lie to the people who had recruited him. The record ends with the deception, leaving the man himself behind in the silence of the PF Series.