Persian Double Agent Betrayed Nazi Spies via Secret Radio Link

By Constance Bell · August 9, 2026

Nazi intelligence was fed controlled misinformation through a Persian agent who operated in a volatile geography where British and Soviet interests collided.

KISS was Persian. In the clinical language of the UK National Archives, he is categorized under the "Personal (PF Series) Files" for World War II Double Agent Operations. According to the catalogue entry for file KV 2/1284, KISS was a Double Cross agent who maintained a radio link with the Abwehr, the military intelligence service of Nazi Germany.

That link, the record states, was eventually taken over by Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME). For those familiar with the mechanics of wartime deception, the transition of a radio link from an agent's own control to a state intelligence apparatus is the moment a person ceases to be a rogue actor and becomes a tool of the state. The catalogue entry notes that the case was "notable" because it involved a period of collaboration with Soviet Intelligence. In the high-stakes environment of the Middle East during the 1940s, such a partnership was less a gesture of friendship and more a precarious tactical necessity.

The Twenty Committee

To understand the framework into which KISS was slotted, one must look to the broader management of the Double Cross system. Other entries in the National Archives, specifically KV 4/63, KV 4/64, KV 4/65, and KV 4/66, record the formation and minutes of the Twenty Committee. This body was the nerve center for the XX System, the British effort to turn Axis agents and feed them controlled misinformation.

While the Twenty Committee provided the strategic oversight, the operational reality for agents like KISS was often more fragmented. The system produced legendary successes—such as Juan Pujol Garcia, the agent codenamed GARBO (KV 2/40), whose activities were tracked from the German perspective to deceive the enemy about the Normandy landings. But while GARBO operated at the highest levels of strategic deception, KISS was embedded in the volatile geography of the Middle East, dealing with the immediate pressures of radio traffic and the shifting loyalties of the Persian theater.

Tehran and Baghdad

The catalogue entry for KV 2/1284 specifies that the records for KISS are distributed across three supplementary volumes. These include the SIME operational file and the files of the Combined Intelligence Centres in Tehran and Baghdad. The mention of these two cities underscores the strategic importance of the Persian corridor, a vital artery for Allied supplies moving toward the Soviet Union.

Intelligence work in this region required a level of coordination that often led to administrative friction. The archivist notes that there is "some inevitable duplication" across these volumes. This duplication is a telltale sign of the chaos of field operations, where multiple centers—SIME, Tehran, and Baghdad—were likely reporting on the same radio traffic simultaneously. Despite the overlap, the record confirms that "much if not all of the radio traffic" is preserved. This traffic represents the actual dialogue between the British-controlled agent and the Abwehr, the raw material of deception where a single misplaced word could collapse an entire operation.

Soviet Intelligence

What elevates KISS from a standard double agent to a "notable" case was the involvement of the Soviets. The catalogue entry plainly records this collaboration. During the war, the British and Soviets were allies by circumstance, but they remained competitors in every other sense, particularly in their aspirations for influence in the Middle East.

Collaboration with Soviet Intelligence was always a gamble. It required the British to share just enough information to maintain the alliance without compromising the integrity of their own assets. The fact that KISS’s case involved this overlap suggests he was operating in a space where the interests of London and Moscow converged, or perhaps where they collided. In the professional world of the Double Cross system, bringing a third party—especially one as predatory as Soviet intelligence—into a radio link with the Abwehr added a layer of risk that would have made any handler in the Twenty Committee uneasy.

BLACKGUARD

The file on KISS does not exist in a vacuum. The catalogue entry mentions that the record also contains "some details of the BLACKGUARD double agent case." This indicates that the web of deception in the Middle East was interconnected, with agents and operations bleeding into one another.

We are left with a fragmented picture: a Persian agent, a captured radio link, and the overlapping interests of three different intelligence services operating out of Tehran and Baghdad. The record tells us that the radio traffic is there, buried in the supplementary volumes, awaiting a researcher to piece together exactly what the Abwehr believed they were hearing. The catalogue ends its description there, leaving the ultimate fate of the BLACKGUARD case and the specifics of the Soviet collaboration for the reader of the full file to uncover.