Soviets Tasked 280 Submarines to Hunt US Polaris Missile Boats

By Eleanor Voss · August 9, 2026

US missile boats were hunted by a Soviet fleet of 335 vessels, while new nuclear attack boats spent 18 months in secret fitting-out to hide advanced weapons.

In September 1971, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence produced a memorandum titled "The Soviet Attack Submarine Force: Evolution and Operations." According to the OCR-extracted text of the document, the Soviet Union then possessed the largest submarine fleet in the world, totaling some 335 vessels. While 55 of these were designated for strategic strike missions, 280 were attack submarines tasked with the defense against Polaris ballistic missile submarines, the countering of aircraft carriers, and the interdiction of sea lines of communication.

The document describes a fleet in transition. While roughly 150 of the attack submarines were considered obsolete, 130 were modern long-range diesel and nuclear units. Specifically, the Soviets operated about 60 nuclear-powered attack submarines, a figure the CIA noted was "slightly more than the United States." The scale of the operation had expanded rapidly; since 1963, the number of days on distant patrol had increased sevenfold, with the most concentrated effort appearing in the Mediterranean.

Stalin's Thousand-Ship Dream

The memorandum divides the evolution of the Soviet attack force into three distinct phases. The first, spanning 1950 to 1957, was defined by a drive for sea-line interdiction. The record indicates that Stalin, impressed by German efforts during World War II, likely planned a massive procurement program that may have envisioned as many as 1,000 new submarines. To achieve this, the Soviets studied German designs and employed expatriated Germans.

The ambition of the program far outstripped the result. By 1957, only 292 submarines of the W, Z, and Q classes had been constructed. The W class, the largest of the group, was limited by its endurance; under optimum conditions, it could remain on station about 1,800 nautical miles from its base for approximately 10 days. Consequently, only the long-range Z class units were deemed suited to reach US sea lines to Europe and sustain lengthy operations.

Cruise Missile Conversions

Between 1958 and 1966, the Soviet focus shifted toward the threat of US aircraft carriers. The goal was to strike a carrier before its aircraft could be launched. This led to the development of cruise missile submarines, starting with the conversion of 13 W class units to carry launch tubes. Some of these were designated as "Twin Cylinder" conversions with tubes on the deck, while others were "Long Bin" conversions with tubes built into an oversized sail.

Beyond these modifications, the Soviets built new nuclear-powered classes, including the E-I and E-II, and the diesel-powered J class. By 1968, 49 such submarines with a total of 318 launch tubes had been produced, all equipped with the SS-N-3 cruise missile. The memorandum notes that diesel submarines remained a staple of production because they cost about one-third as much as nuclear units, and because they served as a hedge against potential setbacks in the nuclear program—a concern validated by propulsion system breakdowns in the early nuclear N class.

32 Knots and the V Class

The third phase began around 1967, triggered by the introduction of the US Polaris ballistic missile submarine. The CIA noted that the Soviets viewed the submarine as the most effective counter to the Polaris threat, leading to an emphasis on speed, advanced sonar, and increased depth.

The V class torpedo attack submarine emerged as the premier Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessel. Nuclear-powered and capable of speeds up to 32 knots, it was described as the fastest operational submarine in the world at the time. However, the document suggests a gap between speed and stealth, noting that V class noise levels remained too high for "covert trailing operations."

For coastal defense, the Soviets relied on the B class diesel submarine. While slower—reaching a maximum of 20 knots for only one hour—the B class was inherently quieter when operating on batteries and could get under way more quickly than nuclear units, which required hours for propulsion plant startup.

A Class Fitting-Out

The record concludes with speculation on newer, less understood vessels. The A class, the smallest of the new nuclear attack submarines at 250 feet, is described as having spent 18 months in a fitting-out position between two barges. The CIA analysts suspected this long period indicated the inclusion of advanced weapons or sensors, or perhaps the presence of "bugs" related to the hull or propulsion systems.

One of the most concrete indicators of a shift in capability mentioned in the text is the appearance of larger bow torpedo tube shutters. On new attack classes, these shutters measured approximately three feet in diameter, compared to the two-foot shutters of older models. This physical change suggested the deployment of a new or larger weapon, possibly a rocket-propelled torpedo similar to the US MK-48 or SUBROC. The memorandum notes that the Soviets had been working on a rocket-torpedo for nearly a decade, but the record leaves the operational status of such a weapon an open question.