George Kennan Dissolves Psychological Warfare Unit
By Constance Bell ·
Frank Wisner was told his psychological warfare unit was over by a higher level decision, but the strategic reasons remained hidden from him.
George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Lovett on February 17, 1948. It is a brief, Top Secret directive with a singular, cold purpose: the dissolution of the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluation.
Published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volume on the emergence of the intelligence establishment, the memo is a study in the disciplined application of authority. Kennan’s request is not a suggestion for a transition or a proposal for a reorganization. He writes that the work of the subcommittee "should be promptly brought to a conclusion and the subcommittee dissolved."
"Higher Level Decision"
The subcommittee in question was tasked with psychological warfare operations. In the immediate wake of the Second World War, the United States had relied on the SANACC (State-Army-Navy-Air-Canadian Coordination Committee) to bridge the gap between military intelligence and diplomatic strategy. It was a clumsy, multi-agency arrangement designed for a world that no longer existed by 1948. As the Cold War hardened, the need for a more professional, streamlined approach to the information war became a priority for the Policy Planning Staff.
There is a certain efficiency in the way Kennan handles the termination. He does not invite a debate on the subcommittee's merits or request a final report on its achievements. He simply moves for its erasure. For those accustomed to the slow grind of government administration, Kennan’s precision is refreshing. He understood that in the realm of psychological warfare, the decision to stop an operation is often as strategically significant as the decision to start one.
Frank Wisner
The most striking detail of the memorandum is not the order to dissolve the unit, but the instructions on how to deliver the news. The target of the order was Mr. Wisner—Frank Wisner, a man who would later become a central figure in the CIA's covert operations.
Kennan explicitly instructs Lovett that "because of security considerations, Mr. Wisner should not be informed of the reasons lying behind your instructions." The operative was to be kept in the dark regarding the strategic shift that rendered his work obsolete. Wisner was to be told only that the dissolution was "in response to higher level decision."
This is the necessary reality of clandestine work. The man executing the task is rarely the man who decides if the task is still useful. By insulating Wisner from the rationale, Kennan ensured that the internal deliberations of the National Security Council remained secure and that the chain of command remained absolute. The subordinate’s role is to execute; the director’s role is to prune. To allow a mid-level officer to litigate the "reasons" for a shutdown is to invite inefficiency and leak risk.
Washington, February 17, 1948
The memo was written at a pivot point for American power. The State Department was shifting away from the broad, experimental coordination of the SANACC years toward a more centralized intelligence apparatus. While this specific memorandum provides only a snapshot of one subcommittee's end, it points toward a larger consolidation of power within the intelligence community.
Other records of this era, such as the "Subject Files" held in the US National Archives (NAID 6789803) and the CIA Reading Room's records of "NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STATUS OF PROJECTS" from 1950, suggest that this pruning was part of a wider effort to formalize how the United States fought for the world's opinion. The SANACC subcommittee was a relic of a transitional period, and Kennan saw it as such.
The document is remarkably sparse. It mentions the absence of a Mr. Saltzman, which necessitated Lovett’s direct intervention with Wisner, but it offers no further context on the personnel involved. It leaves us with a clinical image of power: a director, a superior, and an operative who is told his work is over without being told why.
The record does not include Lovett's response to Kennan, nor does it record how Frank Wisner received the news that his subcommittee had been abolished by a "higher level decision."