Panamanian junta seeks $1,930,000 annuity increase to avoid public unrest
By Marcus Boone ·
Colonel Torrijos and Colonel Martinez risked 'riding a tiger' by inciting the public over the canal while internal warnings cautioned that the junta remained inexperienced.
The President's Daily Brief for February 4 and 5, 1969, arrives as a fragmented map of global instability, compiled from OCR-extracted text in the CIA's electronic reading room. It is a document of "late notes" and urgent updates, capturing a moment where the Nixon administration was attempting to calibrate its response to a series of simmering frictions in Saigon, Panama City, and Moscow.
Replace Premier Huong
In South Vietnam, the record captures a power struggle within the government of the Republic of Vietnam. Vice President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ told Ambassador Lodge that he intended to return to Saigon on February 8. The stated purpose was to pressure President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to reorganize the government, specifically to replace Premier Huong.
While Kỳ argued that the cabinet needed to be "strengthened" to compete with the Communists in a postwar environment, the brief is candid about the underlying motive. In Kỳ's view, strengthening the cabinet simply meant "ousting his personal enemy Huong" and installing his own supporters. This internal friction coincided with the diplomatic theater in Paris. The brief notes a conversation on January 31 between Ambassador Lodge and Soviet Ambassador Zorin, in which Zorin suggested that the United States should initiate troop withdrawals before addressing political matters.
Zorin further suggested that Lodge use his "influence" in Saigon to change the government to facilitate talks. The brief describes this as a "fine scenario from the Communist point of view," noting that it mirrored propaganda lines regarding the necessity of a "peace cabinet." The record suggests that while Hanoi likely viewed this as a maximum opening position, the North Vietnamese were simultaneously apprehensive about a gradual "de-Americanization" of the war. Such a transition, they feared, would undermine their primary leverage: domestic American pressure to end the conflict.
Riding a Tiger
An annexed report provides a detailed psychological profile of the military junta in Panama, which had seized power in October 1968, marking the first direct military government in the republic's 65-year history. The brief identifies a rivalry between the two primary authors of the coup: Colonel Torrijos and Colonel Martinez.
Martinez is characterized as "aggressive" and possessing a "reputation for honesty that is rare in Panamanian politics," whereas Torrijos is described as more prone to dealing with old-line politicians. The brief warns that a government dominated by Martinez would likely push for more rapid reform, potentially making the relationship between the military and the upper-class elite "more tenuous."
Regarding the canal, the brief suggests the junta is wary. The colonels are described as knowing that if they stimulated the public over the canal, they would be "riding a tiger," as an aroused populace could threaten the junta's own rule. However, the US remains exposed. The record notes that the junta's leadership is inexperienced and that any acceptance of previous draft treaties would leave them open to charges of "selling out to the US."
February 1 Satellite Failure
Beyond the geopolitical maneuvering, the brief records a technical failure in the Soviet space program. On February 1, the Soviets failed to orbit a weather satellite, leaving their monitoring program "limping" with only one active system in orbit.
This failure is framed not just as a technical lapse but as a diplomatic one. It made it more difficult for Moscow to fulfill obligations under a series of US-USSR agreements dating back to 1962 regarding the timely exchange of meteorological data. The record notes that the USSR had historically sent limited data to the US, often late and of poor quality.
Other brief entries fill the gaps of the global snapshot. In Canada, the government considered accelerating its initial contact with Chinese Communists in Stockholm from February 7 to February 4 due to press leaks in Japan. In Cuba, a note sent via the Swiss indicated that Havana was unwilling to approve the unrestricted entry of Cubans returning from the US, specifically barring anyone who had left the island illegally. The brief contains several redactions, marked as "50X1," particularly in the sections regarding Cuba and Peru.
In Peru, the brief notes that government officials had become convinced that the danger of US sanctions over the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company was "real," leading the government to "trim its propaganda sails." However, the analysts viewed this as a "cosmetic change," believing the nationalistic advisers were too committed to their case to make substantive concessions.
As for Panama, the brief concludes that the junta may seek immediate concessions through executive agreement rather than complex treaties. These potential requests included the transfer of canal zone properties or an increase in the present annuity of $1,930,000.