US Army Spent $2.1 Billion on Hunter UAVs That Crashed 20 Times
By Miriam Adler ·
Defense officials ignored 'unacceptable' test ratings for years, pushing a system too large for airlift through the production pipeline until the program was terminated in 1996.
Twenty air vehicle crashes. An original price tag of $1.2 billion that climbed to an expected $2.1 billion. According to a program description mirrored by the FAS Intelligence Resource Program, the Hunter Short Range (SR) UAV was intended to be a multi-role system for the U.S. Army, manufactured and marketed jointly with TRW/S&ITG and Israel Aerospace Industries.
Public records identify the system as the IAI RQ-5 Hunter, a UAV designed to take off and land on runways, using gimbaled sensors to relay real-time video. It was supposed to be a tool for Corps Commanders, providing day and night reconnaissance and target acquisition. Instead, the record paints a picture of a procurement process that ignored its own warning lights for years.
4 of 11 Relay Flights
The fundamental promise of the Hunter was its ability to extend its reach. While it had a direct radius of action of 200 km, it could reach over 300 km by using a second Hunter as an airborne relay. This was not a luxury; it was a requirement for seeing over terrain and overcoming line-of-sight limits.
During Limited User Testing in 1992, the system failed this core premise. The FAS record notes that Hunter "successfully completed only 4 of 11 relay flights." The test results were blunt: the ability to transmit video imagery during these operations was "unacceptable for a fielded system." Furthermore, the drone was unreliable and could not meet Army time standards for artillery adjustments.
In a functioning system of oversight, an "unacceptable" rating for a primary mission capability would halt production. In the world of defense procurement, it appears to have been a footnote.
Document imagery from irp.fas.org From the files: irp.fas.org
January 1993
Despite the 1992 failures, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) moved forward. In January 1993, a low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract worth $171 million was awarded to Israel Aircraft Industries/TRW for seven Hunter systems.
The record suggests the government was rushing a product that wasn't ready. The FAS document observes that the Department of Defense did not allow enough time for the system integration of non-developmental components or the analysis needed to create a logistic support system. This haste had physical consequences: several crashes occurred in such short order that the entire system was grounded for months.
By the time the first LRIP system was finally accepted on April 14, 1995, it was nearly a year behind schedule. The acceptance testing didn't find a polished product, but rather "new deficiencies" involving the engines, the data link, and the software.
Document imagery from irp.fas.org From the files: irp.fas.org
Too Large for Airlift
Beyond the software glitches and the crashes, the Hunter suffered from a basic failure of geometry. The FAS record states the system—including its support vehicles and associated parts—was "far too large to fit in the number of airlift aircraft specified for moving one system."
The Navy attempted to find a place for the technology, validating requirements in May 1993 and later directing that 18 full-rate production systems be adapted for aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships. But the logistical rot was deep. Demonstrations in 1993 had already shown the system could not be supported in the field. Later, reports from the GAO—referenced in the FAS materials—concluded the Hunter system was simply not appropriate for Navy fleet use.
Technically, the aircraft was an odd hybrid: powered by two Moto Guzzi 750 cc pusher/puller engines and running on 87 octane mogas. It could fly up to 16,000 feet and dash at 110 knots, but these specifications mattered little if the drone could not reliably send a video feed or fit inside a transport plane.
By October 1995, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council finally recommended that the program be terminated. The decision arrived on January 31, 1996, when the Defense Acquisition Executive announced that no additional Hunter systems would be procured beyond the low-rate production.
Of the 50 planned production systems, only seven were delivered. The record leaves us with the final tally: a multi-billion dollar investment in a system that crashed twenty times and failed its most basic tests, yet was pushed through the production pipeline regardless. Related files on the subject exist in the National Security Archive and the Internet Archive, including GAO reports from 1995 and 1997, though the FAS record provides the most clinical summary of the collapse.