Army spent 15 years fixing 35 AN/TRQ-37 signal hunters bought without a plan
By Marcus Boone ·
Adversaries and dissidents were hunted by CEWI teams using 35 systems the Army bought without a plan to maintain or repair them over time.
The AN/TRQ-37 TACFIX is a shelter-mounted direction finder. It consists of two receivers, a processor, and a "quick erecting DF antenna/mast assembly." Its purpose is simple: locate a signal. Its function, however, is limited. According to an archival entry from the FAS Intelligence Resource Program, the system provides "Line-of-Bearing data only." To arrive at a "true DF"—the actual location of a transmitter—the operator must exert manual control.
"Line-of-Bearing data only"
In the world of Communications Electronics Warfare Intelligence (CEWI), a line of bearing is a starting point, not a destination. It is a vector, a line stretching from the receiver toward the source of a radio transmission. To turn that line into a coordinate on a map, you need a second line from a different location. Where those lines intersect is where the target sits.
The TACFIX was the tool used to draw those lines. By deploying these units, CEWI teams could sweep the airwaves, catching the electronic footprints of adversaries or dissidents, and narrowing the search area. The requirement for manual control suggests a process of iterative tuning and physical adjustment, a human element wedged between the receiver and the target. It was a game of patience and triangulation, conducted from the interior of a military shelter.
September 1979
The history of the TACFIX is also a history of procurement negligence. In September 1979, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) purchased 35 of these original systems for "readiness training." The purchase was made "without life-cycle ILS"—Integrated Logistics Support.
In plain terms, the government bought 35 complex pieces of intelligence hardware without a plan for how to maintain them, repair them, or keep them operational over time. It is a recurring theme in military spending: the rush to acquire a capability today while ignoring the cost of keeping it working tomorrow. The hardware arrived, but the support system did not. For nearly five years, these systems existed in a state of precariousness, useful only as long as they didn't break.
TOAD
It took until January 1984 for the Department of the Army to task the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) with developing the missing logistics support. The recovery was slow. Spare and repair parts were not "in place" until June 1986.
As the 1980s progressed, the military attempted to refine the hardware to match the reality of its deployment. In September 1987, the antenna underwent a design change specifically to allow for installation in a shelter. By April 1989, a procurement data package was submitted to "upgrade system capabilities," and by June of that year, full depot support was finally established at TOAD.
This decade-long struggle to make 35 direction finders sustainable reveals a gap between the desire for surveillance and the will to manage it. The units were purchased for "readiness training," but the logistics of that readiness were an afterthought, outsourced to a series of corrective actions that spanned the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Who was being located?
By February 1994, the system transitioned from FORSCOM (Level I) to CECOM (Level II). This administrative hand-off marked the end of the timeline provided in the FAS record.
The document is a ledger of hardware and maintenance, not a log of operations. It tells us what the Army bought and how they struggled to keep it running, but it remains silent on where these 35 systems were deployed. It does not list the frequencies they monitored, the theaters of operation where the masts were erected, or the identities of the people whose "Line-of-Bearing" was tracked by CEWI units.
We know the equipment existed. We know it required a human operator to manually coax a true location from a signal. We know the Army spent fifteen years trying to figure out how to maintain 35 of them. The record leaves the most critical question unanswered: whose transmissions were being hunted?