US Official Justifies Liquidating Trujillo to Save Thousands
By Desmond Okafor ·
Rafael Trujillo was marked for liquidation by a US official who compared the murder to Hiroshima to justify saving thousands of lives in the long run.
March 22, 1961. An airgram sent from the Consulate General in Ciudad Trujillo to the Department of State does not mince words about the morality of murder. To justify the potential assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, the writer, an official named Dearborn, reaches for the most extreme precedent in the American arsenal: the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
Liquidation as the only way
The document paints a picture of a country suffocating under "El Jefe," the generalissimo who had held power since 1930. Dearborn reports that "80 to 90 per cent of literate Dominicans are anti-Trujillo" and desire a representative government that respects basic human rights. Yet, the opposition is not a unified front. It is a collection of "small nuclei" operating in the shadows of a state that relies on "domination through fear."
The record is blunt about why these groups have turned to violence. In the past, whenever a conspiratorial group became too visible, it was "caught and ruthlessly suppressed," often through torture and the "assassination of the most courageous elements." In this environment, the consulate concludes that "liquidation" is the only viable path.
Dearborn's defense of this path is startling. He writes that while political assassination is "ugly and repulsive," it must be judged in its own context. He explicitly compares the planned killing of Trujillo to the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima, arguing that the latter was used "to save thousands of lives in the long run." This is the logic of the State Department on the ground: the murder of one man is framed as a mathematical necessity to prevent further slaughter. He asserts that those favoring the assassination are not "morally bankrupt," suggesting that if the Americans were Dominicans, they would be identified with those very conspirators.
A military question mark
While the literate population is anti-Trujillo, the consulate is less certain about the men with the guns. The military is described as a "question mark," with Dearborn suggesting that the soldiers may not have any thoughts "beyond staying out of trouble and living as well as possible."
There is a cold pragmatism to the analysis. The consulate suspects that the military will simply follow whoever wins. If Trujillo were to vanish, the army might follow Joaquín Balaguer or a junta, but eventually, a civilian would emerge. Dearborn notes that those "friendly to us" have a "near monopoly" on "brains and influence."
This suggests a U.S. strategy that is less about the restoration of organic democracy and more about the management of elite transitions. The concern is not whether the Dominican people are truly free, but whether the people who take over are "pro-U.S." and "subscribe to the principles of the OAS." This elitism extends to the rural population; Dearborn dismisses the campesino as someone who has not yet been "politically awakened" and will be a "pawn of whatever element takes over."
A choice between two difficult alternatives
The airgram frames the U.S. position as a strategic gamble. Since August 1960, the consulate believes Trujillo has been "softening up" the country for "leftist extremists." The document mentions a suspicion that communists have been working through Trujillo and Radio Caribe in pursuit of Moscow's ends, though Dearborn admits the Consulate "cannot prove it."
Dearborn argues that the U.S. faces a choice. One path is "momentary expediency"—working with Trujillo while keeping a distance. The other is actively supporting the "establishment of a representative government." The consulate warns that if the U.S. sticks with the dictator for the sake of short-term stability, its "prestige and influence" will vanish the moment he does.
The document is a plea for urgency. Dearborn believes that if Trujillo were "overthrown today," the U.S. would "come out of the situation better than we ever will again." He cautions, however, that the transition from a thirty-one-year dictatorship will not be an "administrative shift in personnel" or a polite "meeting of the National Security Council." It will be messy. It will involve bloodshed.
The airgram concludes with a call for patience and understanding, acknowledging that the U.S. cannot "know all the answers of what is good for the D.R." yet insists that the overthrow of Trujillo is in the immediate interest of the United States.
Two months after this airgram was sent, in May 1961, Rafael Trujillo was indeed liquidated. He was shot and killed in his car while traveling between his palace and his estate.