Ethiopian Junta Liquidates American Military Attaches
By Roy Castellano ·
US military attaches were liquidated and embassy staff halved while the leadership of Ethiopia's most radical socialist movement disappeared during a violent internal purge.
A. Tienkin, the American Charge d'Affaires in Ethiopia, met with Soviet Ambassador A.P. Ratanov at the Soviet Embassy on September 3, 1977. The record, an English translation of a Russian original from the Wilson Center Digital Archive, comes from Ratanov's own journal. It describes a diplomatic dance conducted while the country was being torn apart by internal purges and external territorial threats.
At the time, Ethiopia was ruled by the Provisional Military Administrative Council, known as the PMAC. According to the public record, this military junta, or Derg, would hold power until 1987. By September 1977, the PMAC had already signaled its hostility toward Western influence. Tienkin noted that while there were some signs of improvement in American-Ethiopian relations—specifically the United States' readiness to continue economic aid—the atmosphere remained volatile.
May's Liquidated Attaches
The diplomatic friction was not merely a matter of rhetoric. In the months preceding the meeting, the PMAC had taken direct action against the American presence in Addis Ababa. Ratanov's notes record that in May of that year, the PMAC "liquidated a group of American military attaches and a military adviser." This was not a diplomatic withdrawal but a forced removal, accompanied by a demand that the total embassy staff be reduced by one half.
Tienkin believed that the Ethiopian government might now be inclined to satisfy American requests to maintain certain staff, particularly in the economic and trade sections. However, this hope was tempered by the reality of Ethiopia's shift toward a socialist model. Tienkin observed that given the current policy, the United States was "not convinced" that Ethiopia could maintain normal relations with capitalist countries.
"Going Too Fast"
The internal struggle for the soul of the Ethiopian revolution was marked by a violent competition over the speed of socialist transformation. From the American perspective, the PMAC "is going too fast." Yet, the record suggests a darker irony: the PMAC was not radical enough for everyone.
Tienkin pointed to the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, or MEISON, noting that the leadership of this group possessed a "greater radicalism" than that of the PMAC. This ideological gap had a lethal consequence. Tienkin suggested that MEISON's desire to move even faster toward a socialist state was a primary reason for the "disappearance" of that leadership in comparison with the PMAC.
For an analyst, this is a familiar pattern. When a regime commits to a total social transformation, the only direction for the political wind to blow is toward more extreme measures. The "disappearance" of those who are too radical for the current regime is often a precursor to the regime itself becoming the very thing it purged.
Somalia's Territorial Pretensions
Beyond the internal purges, the conversation turned to the regional instability of the Horn of Africa. Tienkin identified Eritrea as the most difficult of Ethiopia's domestic problems, stating that by comparison, the "problem of the liberation of the Ogaden seems easy."
The Ogaden region was the flashpoint of a brewing conflict with Somalia. While Tienkin believed Ethiopia would secure its border and avoid dismemberment, he saw no possibility for normalization. He noted that Somalia was "unlikely to renounce its territorial pretensions to Ethiopia."
Strategically, the United States was playing both sides of the fence. Tienkin admitted that American-Somali relations were improving and that the U.S. had "agreed in principle" to the delivery of defensive weapons to Somalia. However, these deliveries were stalled due to the ongoing military actions in the Ogaden. The U.S. maintained a delicate line, asserting that this agreement did not mean they failed to recognize the territorial integrity of Somalia.
There were also the rumors of Israeli involvement. Tienkin acknowledged reports that Israel was rendering military aid to Ethiopia. He claimed there were no clear indications to confirm the rumors, but added that if Israel were acting, it would be on its own initiative, without consultation with the United States.
Ambassador Ratanov countered by framing the Soviet Union's support for Ethiopia as a response to a choice made by Ethiopia itself to meet its own socio-economic needs. He argued that this socialist orientation should still allow for a private sector and mixed state-private firms.
Tienkin did not challenge the Soviet Union's military aid to Ethiopia, nor did he offer reproaches. Instead, he focused his curiosity on the Soviet Union's relationship with Somalia, specifically the results of Siad Barre's trip to Moscow.