Trujillo sought American PR expert to mask regime brutalities
By Vera Kessler ·
Dominicans endured brutalities and suppression while their dictator sought a U.S. brand manager to polish his image and diplomats weighed his regime's strategic utility.
At the Palacio Nacional in Ciudad Trujillo, Robert Murphy and Igor Cassini observed a precise, if hollow, choreography of power. In April 1961, they were first received for a few minutes by President Joaquin Balaguer and Foreign Minister Porfirio Herrera Baez for what the record describes as "perfunctory conversation." Only then did the Generalissimo, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, join them. The protocol was deliberate: it was designed to mark Trujillo’s status as a "private citizen," despite the fact that he remained the absolute arbiter of Dominican life.
According to a May 2, 1961, memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy—which includes Murphy's report on the visit—the Generalissimo was in "excellent health and spirits" in his seventieth year. He presented a face of serene stability, claiming the population stood "whole-heartedly" behind him. He dismissed the OAS embargo as a psychological irritation rather than a material hardship and insisted that he had no plans to establish a family dynasty. This was the mask of the dictator: a man claiming he was "certainly no Batista," promising that constitutional processes were sufficient to maintain order should he disappear from the scene.
A Professional Public Relations Expert
Trujillo was not merely seeking diplomatic reentry; he was seeking a brand manager. The record shows that Trujillo authorized Cassini to develop a plan for "improved communications," which specifically included the recruitment of a "professional public relations expert from the U.S." to work within the Dominican Republic.
The objective was explicit: to craft a "better public image of the D.R. abroad" and launch an attack on what Trujillo termed "baseless and distorted stories regarding the regime." This effort would target reports of "brutalities and suppression," which the Generalissimo viewed as the work of obscure sources. In his view, a controlled press was a "liability," and he expressed a desire to open the country to a "truly free press," provided that press was guided by a polished, American-made narrative.
Tunisia, Guinea and the Congo
Robert Murphy, the diplomat, found the United States' hostility toward Trujillo to be "unwise." In his report, Murphy argues that the U.S. was being inconsistent in its application of democratic standards. He proposes a comparison with other nations where the U.S. maintained friendly relations despite the presence of strongmen.
Murphy cites Tunisia under Bourguiba, Guinea under Sekou Toure, and the Republic of the Congo (French) under Abbe Youlou. He notes that in the case of Brazzaville, Youlou had come to power through the "massacre of opposing tribal leaders" and maintained control via "brutal methods." Murphy admits that by no reasonable standard was Brazzaville the capital of a democracy, yet the U.S. maintained diplomatic relations there and extended "substantial material aid."
Murphy’s logic is a study in cold pragmatism. He argues that the Dominican Republic had provided more consistent support for U.S. policies in "E-W relations" than any of the African examples. Given this utility, Murphy suggests that the U.S. should "walk back the cat and initiate a policy of guidance," treating the regime at Ciudad Trujillo as a group "eager and willing to be taken by the hand" toward democratic reform.
A 'Liberal Leader' Compromised
McGeorge Bundy, writing to Kennedy, was not convinced by Murphy's comparisons. While Murphy saw a strategic opening for "friendly leadership," Bundy saw a political liability. He warns the President that the "whole concept of the Alliance for Progress"—Kennedy's signature initiative to promote economic cooperation and democratic growth in Latin America—would be "gravely shadowed" if the administration adopted a policy of "friendly guidance" toward a man like Trujillo.
Bundy’s concerns were not rooted in a sudden moral epiphany regarding the victims of the Trujillo regime, but in the optics of the Kennedy presidency. He explicitly warns that if the public discovered Igor Cassini was providing "public relations help" to the Generalissimo, Kennedy's own personal position as a "liberal leader might be compromised." Bundy’s advice is stark: the President should be "fully disengaged from any venture of this sort."
The memorandum leaves the matter of the May 1961 presidential elections hanging. Trujillo had declared he was prepared to accept OAS observers and "full publicity" for the vote. He claimed his constitution required elections in May and that it would be "most difficult" to move them earlier.
Less than a month after Bundy’s memo was sent, on May 30, 1961, Rafael Trujillo was assassinated in his car while traveling on a highway between Ciudad Trujillo and Baní.