Navy Lost $230 Million When Fire Destroyed Clandestine SEAL Submersible
By Desmond Okafor ·
Elite forces were left without a long-range, dry-interior submersible for over a decade after a prototype fire erased a $230 million investment in clandestine insertion.
A 65-foot submersible with a price tag of $230 million is a significant investment in the art of the unseen. According to a program page mirrored by the FAS Intelligence Resource Program, the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) was designed to provide a "long-range submersible capability" for clandestine missions, offering improved speed, payload, and habitability for a SEAL squad. It was not merely a boat, but a specialized tool for the delivery of elite forces into objective areas where any other form of insertion would be too visible.
For decades, the Navy relied on Dry Deck Shelters (DDS)—air-transportable chambers installed on the decks of nuclear submarines, such as the Sturgeon class. These shelters allowed SEALs to "lock out" of the submarine while it remained submerged, either swimming to their target or boarding a SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV). The FAS record notes that these operations included a range of high-risk activities: reconnaissance, surveillance, and the monitoring of enemy communications.
"Combat Swimmer Attacks"
The scope of these missions, as listed in the FAS file, is explicit. The special warfare teams were tasked with "Combat Swimmer Attacks," beach feasibility studies, and hydrographic surveys in support of amphibious landings. While the record frames these as necessary military functions, they represent the sharp end of a clandestine spear, designed to operate in the gray zones of international conflict where the lack of a visible footprint is the primary requirement for success.
To facilitate this, the Navy developed the SDV, with the Coastal Systems Station serving as the Technical Direction Agent for the Mk-VIII and Mk-IX boats. The goal was a seamless transition from the depth of a nuclear-powered attack submarine to the shallow waters of an enemy coastline. Because a full-sized submarine cannot risk venturing into shallow water, the SDV acted as the final link in the chain of delivery. The record describes the New Attack Submarine as a platform capable of supporting a "full spectrum" of these missions, including sabotage, diversionary attacks, and the direction of air strikes.
Document imagery from irp.fas.org From the files: irp.fas.org
Northrop Grumman
By the early 1990s, the Navy sought something more capable than the existing SDVs. This led to the development of the ASDS, a project managed by the NAVSEA PMS 395 Deep Submergence Directorate and built by Northrop Grumman Ocean Systems. The contract for detailed design and manufacturing was awarded in fiscal year 1994.
Northrop Grumman’s Baltimore-based Electronic Sensors and Systems Division, employing roughly 700 people at the time, was tasked with creating a "manned dry interior battery-powered submersible." This was a critical distinction; unlike earlier platforms, the ASDS promised a dry environment for the crew, which theoretically increased the endurance and effectiveness of the operators. USSOCOM funded the procurement of three such vessels, with the first intended to enter service in 2000, homeported with SEAL Delivery Team One in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To make this system operational, the Navy had to modify its existing fleet. The USS Greeneville (SSN 772), a Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine, served as the Pacific test platform. Between August 1996 and February 1997, the Greeneville underwent alterations at Newport News Shipbuilding to improve noise quieting and install the support systems necessary to host both the ASDS and the Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle.
Document imagery from irp.fas.org From the files: irp.fas.org
A 2008 Fire
The FAS record ends its primary description in 1999, during the early stages of integration and testing. At that moment, the ASDS appeared to be the future of covert insertion—a sophisticated, high-cost answer to the problem of stealthy delivery. However, the public record provides a sobering postscript to the ambitions found in these files.
Despite the $230 million investment and the technical promises of Northrop Grumman, the ASDS program was plagued by reliability issues and spiraling costs. The effort to create a long-range, dry-interior submersible ultimately collapsed. In 2008, the prototype was destroyed in a fire, effectively ending the program's viability. By 2009, the Navy officially canceled the ASDS.
The failure of the ASDS left a gap in the Navy's clandestine insertion capabilities for over a decade. The Navy eventually turned to Lockheed Martin to develop the Dry Combat Submersible (DCS). Roughly half the size of its failed predecessor, the DCS finally became operational in 2023.