Edward Harry Bernard Durrant Betrayed German Intelligence in 1939

By Harlan Pryce ·

German handlers were fed curated information by the Security Service after a former soldier surrendered in Cairo and was detained in the UK.

The file's catalogue entry for KV 2/3759 records a surrender that occurred at the onset of the second great global conflict. In 1939, a former soldier named Edward Harry Bernard Durrant walked into the offices of the authorities in Cairo and volunteered the truth about his employment. He had been recruited by German Intelligence. His specific mandate in Egypt was to "gather information on military matters."

For the Security Service, a man who volunteers is a different kind of asset than one who is captured. The record indicates that after his confession in Cairo, Durrant was returned to the United Kingdom and placed in detention. But the British did not simply close the book on his German handlers. The catalogue entry notes that in Durrant's absence, there was an attempt to keep the "correspondence link with Germany open for deception purposes."

Cairo, 1939

Cairo in 1939 was a hub of colonial administration and a focal point for European intelligence interests. The surrender of a former soldier who had already been integrated into the German intelligence apparatus provided the British with a window into how the Abwehr or other German agencies were operating in North Africa. The catalogue entry does not detail the specific "military matters" Durrant was tasked with gathering, nor does it describe the nature of his recruitment. It simply establishes the fact of his role and his decision to flip.

This pattern of voluntary surrender followed by strategic utilization is a recurring theme in the Security Service's handling of agents. The goal was rarely just to remove the threat; it was to turn the threat into a conduit. By maintaining the correspondence link, the British could feed the Germans curated information, effectively steering the enemy's perception of the theater in Egypt.

"Gather information on military matters"

While the catalogue description for KV 2/3759 is brief, its placement within the wider archives provides a window into the scale of the operation. The file is categorized under the "Personal (PF Series) Files," specifically within the section for "WORLD WAR II. German Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents." This distinction is important. Durrant was not merely a suspect; he was a confirmed recruit who had provided a confession.

Other files in the National Archives, such as KV 2/3760, also bear Durrant's name, indicating a volume of record-keeping that extends beyond a single summary. There are further records, such as LCO 22/35, that list other individuals like Cyril John Milford Abbott and Myles John Abbott, suggesting a broader web of personnel being tracked by the government during this period of volatility.

When the Security Service decided to keep Durrant's link to Germany open, they were employing a tactic that would become a cornerstone of the war effort. The process of "deception purposes" mentioned in the catalogue entry required a delicate balance: the Germans had to believe Durrant was still active and loyal, even while he was detained on British soil.

The PF Series

To understand the significance of the "correspondence link" in Durrant's case, one can look at the related files in the KV 2 series. Files KV 2/63 through KV 2/67 deal with Juan Pujol Garcia, known by the codename GARBO. The catalogue descriptions for the GARBO files explicitly mention "copies of communications by letter and WT with Germans, incorporating British deception material."

Though Durrant's file is categorized under "Agents and Suspected Agents" and the GARBO files are under "Double Agent Operations," the operational logic is identical. Whether the agent was a professional double like Pujol Garcia or a confessed recruit like Durrant, the objective was to transform a security breach into a strategic advantage. The Security Service sought to control the flow of information, ensuring that the intelligence reaching Berlin was exactly what London wanted them to believe.

Durrant's journey from a German recruit in Egypt to a detainee in the UK marks the transition from intelligence gathering to intelligence manipulation. The record doesn't say how long the deception lasted or what specific lies were sent back to Germany in Durrant's name. It leaves us with the image of a man held in detention while his ghost continued to write letters to his former masters.

The record does not state if the correspondence link was ever successfully maintained, or if Durrant himself remained a part of the deception while in detention.