Juan Pujol García fed Nazi Germany a strategic lie to protect D-Day
By Harlan Pryce ·
Strategic deception for D-Day relied on a fictional spy network that Thomas Harris had to protect through ingenious contingency plans as Abwehr defections risked exposing Juan Pujol García.
The catalogue entry for KV 2/4193 at The National Archives in the UK identifies a man by three different aliases: Garbo, Bovril, and Immortal. The subject is Juan Pujol García, a Spanish national who operated as a double agent during World War II. According to the archival description, Pujol García was a "celebrated wartime MI5 double cross agent" whose primary value lay in his ability to maintain a communication channel with the Abwehr, the military intelligence service of Nazi Germany.
Juan Pujol García
Public records establish that Pujol García was a complex figure who worked for the United Kingdom against Germany. While the British knew him as Garbo, the Germans codenamed him Alaric. To maintain his cover and prove his utility to the Abwehr, he created a fictional network of spies, which the Germans referred to as "Arabal."
The catalogue entry for KV 2/4193 notes that the file documents the "progressive development" of this Garbo sub-agent network. It was not a network of people, but a network of fabrications designed to convey disinformation to the enemy. This process of building a believable, invisible organization is a central theme of the file's description, framing the agent not just as a messenger, but as a creator of an entire intelligence ecosystem.
Wireless Telegraphy
While KV 2/4193 focuses on the development and management of the network, other records in the KV 2 series provide the raw data of the deception. Catalogue entries for files KV 2/63, KV 2/64, KV 2/65, KV 2/66, and KV 2/67 all describe a similar set of contents: copies of communications sent to the Germans via letter and WT, or wireless telegraphy.
These entries specify that these communications incorporated "British deception material." This suggests a tightly controlled pipeline where MI5 provided the narrative and Pujol García provided the delivery system. The use of wireless telegraphy was particularly high-risk; it allowed for rapid communication but left a signal that could be triangulated or intercepted, adding a layer of technical tension to the strategic lie. The goal was clear, as the catalogue entry for KV 2/4193 explicitly states: the channel was used for "strategic deception, significantly with regard to D Day."
Thomas Harris
Intelligence operations of this scale rarely rely on a single agent; they require a handler capable of managing the psychological and logistical strain of the lie. The record for KV 2/4193 identifies the case officer as Thomas Harris.
According to the archival description, the security of the Garbo network faced a critical threat following the D-Day landings. This threat did not come from a failure of the agent himself, but from external shifts in the German military structure. The catalogue entry records that the network was "threatened by defections from Abwehr ranks." When German intelligence officers began to defect or be captured, they carried with them the knowledge of who they had been paying and which sources they trusted. If a defecting Abwehr officer revealed the true nature of Alaric and his Arabal network, Pujol García would have been exposed.
In response to this vulnerability, the file's description states that Thomas Harris drew up "various ingenious contingency plans" to protect the agent and the operation. The catalogue entry does not detail the specifics of these plans, but it presents them as necessary measures to ensure that the deception remained intact even as the German intelligence apparatus collapsed from within.
Related archives, such as the Internet Archive's "The who's who of World War II," track the broader legacies of the era's intelligence officers, but the specific tactical maneuvers executed by Harris to shield Garbo remain housed in these personal files. Other materials, including those held by the NSArchive regarding later Russian GRU activity or the CIA Reading Room's documents on the Spanish 2506 Brigade, offer context on the evolution of European intelligence, but they do not touch the specific operational mechanics of the Garbo network.
The details of these "ingenious" contingencies are contained within the pages of KV 2/4193, while the actual evidence of the deception—the letters and wireless transcripts—is split across the five related files in the KV 2/63 to KV 2/67 range.