Trujillo Siphons US Food Funds to Line His Own Pocketbook
By Constance Bell ·
Farmers were kept ignorant of true prices while Trujillo and his officials siphoned off US food funds for personal enrichment, an ambassador warned in 1944.
Ellis O. Briggs had been stationed in Ciudad Trujillo for exactly four weeks when he sat down to write his appraisal of the Dominican Republic. He noted that such a window was likely insufficient to grasp every detail, but argued that a fresh perspective allowed him to remain objective regarding personalities before his vision was "foreshortened."
What Briggs found was a study in contradictions. In a dispatch to the Secretary of State dated July 5, 1944, published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (State Dept) records, the Ambassador described a regime that was functionally superior to anything the island had seen in centuries, yet morally bankrupt.
"Most efficient government"
Briggs did not mince words regarding the operational success of the regime. He wrote that the Trujillo dictatorship was "the most efficient government the republic has ever known," claiming that more material progress had been made in the previous 14 years than in the 438 years since Columbus arrived on the island. According to the public record, Rafael Trujillo—known as "El Jefe"—had ruled as a military officer and dictator since 1930, often through figurehead presidents.
However, Briggs cautioned that this efficiency served a narrow purpose. While Trujillo presented a public face of "liberty, justice and democracy" to the international community, his domestic administration showed a "cynical disregard" for those same principles. The Ambassador characterized the regime as "an enterprise operated primarily for the personal enrichment of himself, his relatives and his satellites." He noted that the dictator’s greed resulted in the impoverishment of the people, both economically and morally, and described Trujillo’s vanity as "colossal."
"Pathological manifestations"
Beyond the internal corruption, Briggs focused on the volatility of the island’s relationship with Haiti. He reported that President Roosevelt had already put the leaders of both nations on notice that they were expected to maintain peace. Despite this, Briggs warned that relations remained susceptible to "sudden deterioration."
He attributed this instability to profound racial, historical, and economic antipathies, which he described as producing "continuing pathological manifestations in the Dominican Republic." With a static land area and a rapidly multiplying population in Haiti, Briggs saw an eventual conflict as likely.
He cautioned that any arms or munitions provided through Lend-Lease or other means would likely be used by one nation against the other. While he acknowledged that Trujillo’s rule negated many American principles, Briggs argued that promoting his overthrow was not the responsibility of the United States and would violate commitments to non-intervention. He viewed Trujillo as a "Dominican problem, for solution by the Dominican people."
"Nuisance value"
The Ambassador's most urgent concern involved the "honesty" of the Dominican government in its dealings with the United States. During the war emergency, the U.S. had supported the Dominican economy through credits and the purchase of commodities. Briggs reported that the benefits of the food purchasing program were not reaching the farmers. Instead, the funds were being "siphoned off by middlemen headed by the President and other high officials."
Trujillo’s government had reportedly declined to publish the price schedules the U.S. was paying, ensuring that producers remained ignorant of the true value of their goods so that middlemen could buy them as cheaply as possible. Briggs insisted that U.S. collaboration should be made contingent upon the Dominican government fulfilling its commitments.
He recognized that demanding honesty might irritate Trujillo, whose "personal pocketbook might be the first to suffer." Briggs analyzed the potential retaliation, noting that Trujillo possessed a certain "nuisance value." If provoked, the dictator could withdraw support for inter-American policies, harass the U.S. Embassy, or use "constitutional procedure" to target American businesses via higher taxes and nationalistic legislation. Briggs noted that Trujillo had already shown he could play both sides, having recently chosen to align with the U.S. on questions regarding Bolivian recognition and relations with Argentina.
A visit to Washington
The dispatch concludes with a deliberation on whether Trujillo should be invited to Washington. Briggs advised against promoting such a visit, fearing it would be interpreted as a "seal of American approval on Trujillo and all his works."
Yet, he pointed out a diplomatic awkwardness: the U.S. continued to receive Elie Lescot, the President of Haiti, while refusing Trujillo. This disparity nourished criticisms of American "partiality." Briggs suggested that if Trujillo put out feelers for a visit, he should be received as a Chief of State with standard honors, but without any indication of special favoritism. He believed there was a remote chance that playing on Trujillo's patriotism and ambition for material progress might yield some benefit for the country.
Briggs recommended that these observations and his insistence on "reciprocal integrity" serve as his terms of reference at the post. He left the Secretary of State with a final reminder that the small Caribbean nations served as a "show-window" through which other, more important nations examined American inter-American relations.