KGB used 800 forged leaflets to neutralize Pakistan's Zia-ul Haq
By Marcus Boone ·
Soviet agents forged letters to Imam Khomeini and manipulated Baluchi leaders to incite ethnic conflict and poison diplomatic ties between Islamabad, Delhi, and Tehran.
The Soviet Union did not merely invade Afghanistan in December 1979; it launched a simultaneous assault on the truth. According to a translation from the Wilson Center Digital Archive, the KGB responded to global protests against the invasion by deploying a doctrine where the means of combat were dictated by the "necessity" of the adversary's conduct. In the eyes of the Chekists, this made any lie legitimate.
This was not accidental misinformation. It was a calculated system where disinformation was viewed as an "indispensable and secret element of intelligence work." The records describe these operations as a form of assistance to "[...] mankind," designed to mislead the "ruling circles of capitalism" to serve the interests of the USSR. For the analysts in Moscow, the primary value of these "Active Measures" was the difficulty of checking the veracity of the information and the identity of the source. They measured success by a "coefficient of utility": the ability to achieve maximum end results with minimum expenditure and effort.
Order No 0066
By April 12, 1982, the KGB Chairman issued Order No 0066, which codified this approach as a baseline for intelligence activity. The order mandated that all First Chief Directorate (FCD) departments participate in devising Active Measures. Young officers were to be given a "taste" for this work, and those who required daily instruction on how to execute these tasks were deemed "unsuitable."
This institutionalized deceit found its most aggressive application in the 1980-82 campaign against Pakistan. In February 1980, Yuri Andropov approved a plan to neutralize the government of Zia-ul Haq. The strategy was a multi-pronged effort to destabilize Pakistan from within and without. The KGB planned to warn the Pakistan Mission in Moscow that if Zia-ul Haq continued his political course, the USSR would exploit the Baluchi and Pushtun movements, as well as internal opposition to the military regime.
SARDAR Leaflets
In February 1981, a Working Group under V.A. Chukhrov launched Operation "TORKHAM." The objective was comprehensive: compromise the Zia-ul Haq regime, weaken the positions of the US and China in Pakistan, and exacerbate relations with Iran.
The tactical implementation was a masterclass in manufactured chaos. The KGB produced 500 leaflets to be disseminated in Islamabad and Karachi, some issued in the name of fictitious Pakistani Army officers. Another 300 leaflets, codenamed "SARDAR," were designed to simulate extreme dissatisfaction among military and public circles.
Beyond leaflets, the KGB engaged in crude but effective forgery. One plan involved producing a "personal letter" from Pakistan's Home Affairs Minister, Mahmud Harun, to Imam Khomeini. The fake letter claimed that Zia-ul Haq intended to restrict the activity of Shiites in Pakistan and appealed to Iranian "brethren" for help. The copy was then sent to a leader of Pakistan's military special service with a note from a "well wisher," a classic play to induce suspicion between allies.
Operation Gvadar
While TORKHAM targeted the regime's stability, a subsequent plan codenamed "GVADAR," devised in March 1981, focused on the Baluchi problem. Colonel M. A. Krapivin oversaw the effort to incite the Baluchi population against the Pakistani authorities.
The KGB sought to supply "slanted information" to Baluchi leaders, suggesting that the Pakistani government intended to permanently settle Afghan refugees on Baluchi pasture lands. They even examined the "technical possibility" of establishing a radio station in Afghanistan that would call for an autonomous Baluchi state.
To further mud the waters, the KGB planned to forge letters from Baluchis to the Pakistani embassy in the US. These letters would contain threats against Zia-ul Haq and falsely suggest that the American authorities and the CIA were providing financial assistance to Baluchi separatists. This was designed to convince the Pakistani leadership that the US was using the Baluchi problem as a lever to force Pakistan to remain a stronghold for the war against Afghanistan.
This campaign was supported by a mouthpiece in Islamabad: a periodical called NIVA. Controlled by the KGB Residency, NIVA placed 239 articles based on "Service A" themes in 1980 and another 216 in the first half of 1981. The records show the Chekist scribes were adept at twisting minor events into intelligence wins; for instance, a local report of a policeman stopping an American embassy car was transformed into a story about US smuggling and links to Pushtunist separatists.
The Chukhrov Working Group eventually considered creating an "Azad-Kashmir" independent of both India and Pakistan, as well as a "Free Baluchistan" government-in-exile based in Afghanistan. However, due to the "extreme complexity and uncertainty" of the situation, the record indicates these specific initiatives were postponed indefinitely.