US Navy Hunted Drug Smugglers With 24 AN/SSQ-108(V) Systems
By Miriam Adler ·
Smugglers operated undetected by failing Cold War gear until the US Navy and UK aligned their signal exploitation to prosecute targets in international waters.
Twenty-four small deck edge antennas. That is the physical footprint of the AN/SSQ-108(V), a US Navy shipboard direction finding system designed to listen to the invisible conversations of the sea. Along with a VHF Adcock antenna, these sensors allow a ship to detect, locate, and identify hostile targets at long range, feeding that data directly into the ship's tactical system.
According to a program description mirrored by the FAS Intelligence Resource Program, the system—known as CLASSIC OUTBOARD—was not keeping pace with the world it was meant to watch. By the mid-1990s, the equipment was described as "old and becoming expensive to maintain." More tellingly, the record notes that the system was "currently ineffective against elements of the current/projected threat environment," a description that specifically includes counter narcotics operations.
"Ineffective Against Elements"
There is a particular kind of bureaucratic honesty in admitting a surveillance system is failing. The shift in focus mentioned in the FAS record is subtle but significant. While the primary mission of CLASSIC OUTBOARD was the identification of "hostile targets," the justification for its upgrade—the Cooperative OUTBOARD Logistics Update, or COBLU—was tied to the "threat environment" of drug trafficking.
This pivot marks a transition in the utility of naval intelligence. Tools once forged for the high-stakes signal battles of the Cold War were being repurposed for the policing of international waters. The Navy wasn't just looking for enemy warships; it was looking for the electronic signatures of smugglers. To achieve this, the Navy sought a "comprehensive surface tactical (CESM) capability to the 21st century."
July 1, 1994
The US did not undertake this modernization alone. On July 1, 1994, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a joint cooperative program. This was not merely a purchase agreement, but a strategic alignment of signal exploitation.
Under the COBLU program, the two nations agreed to share the burden of upgrading the AN/SSQ-108. The FAS record details a phased rollout: Phase 0 focused on the human-computer interface and integration with a joint maritime command information system (JMCIS). Phase 1 targeted a "total update of front-end sensors."
Between fiscal years 1995 and 1999, the funding flowed in increments. FY 96 funds installed hardware procured a year prior; FY 98 funds were earmarked for three direction finding kits, with costs rising because production had stalled in 1996 and 1997. While the US Navy managed its share, the UK was slated to procure five systems in FY 98. This synergy ensured that both navies were listening to the same frequencies, using the same standards, and speaking the same digital language.
Nashua, New Hampshire
The technical muscle behind this update came from Lockheed Sanders of Nashua, NH, the prime contractor for the project. The result was a system designed to be modular and "open." The COBLU Phase 1 configuration was limited to seven racks of equipment and five operator positions.
Lockheed Sanders designed the system so that hardware and software components were "functionally independent." This segmentation was a deliberate choice to ensure that "changes to one segment do not ripple through the entire system," making it easier to upgrade the gear as the "threat evolves." In the world of surveillance, portability and ease of upgrading are the primary virtues. By making the system JMCIS-compliant, the Navy could extend its existing library of cryptologic software, essentially turning the ship's ears into a plug-and-play interface for the latest intelligence tools.
Technical requirements demanded that the system provide signal conditioning to operate in "strong signal environments" and replace old acquisition equipment to better "prosecute detection and recognition of current and new signals of interest." In the lexicon of signal intelligence, to "prosecute" a signal is to hunt it down, isolate it, and strip it of its secrets.
The Inventory Objective
The scale of the operation is captured in the final inventory objectives. The Navy aimed for 24 OUTBOARD systems in total. Eighteen of these were designated for shipboard use, including DDG-963 and CGN ships. The remaining six were destined for the shore: two for training at the Naval Technical Training Center in Pensacola, Florida; one for a fleet trainer in San Diego, California; one for another trainer at Dam Neck, Virginia; one for software support; and one for a land-base test facility for engineering support.
This distribution ensures that the capability to intercept and locate signals is not just a tool for the fleet, but a permanent institutional knowledge base, mirrored across the coastlines. The record leaves the final status of these 24 units to the archives, though it confirms that the systems were designed to integrate with the Cryptologic Unified Build, with testing conducted at the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center.