North Koreans sought Soviet space aid under treaty conditions
By Vera Kessler ·
North Koreans sought satellite capabilities to monitor across distances, but whether Gyae Eung-tae ever signed the required international agreement remains unknown.
In May 1983, a Hungarian commercial counselor in Pyongyang named Imre Rudi sent a memorandum back to his ministry in Budapest. The document, a translation provided by the Cold War International History Project, does not record a direct conversation between Hungary and North Korea, but rather a report of a conversation Rudi had with a third party: V.A. Marushkin, the economic counselor of the Soviet Embassy.
Marushkin had provided Rudi with the details of the 18th session of the Soviet-Korean Intergovernmental Economic, Technical, and Scientific Consultative Commission. The memorandum serves as a window into the way information circulated within the Eastern Bloc—not always through formal diplomatic channels, but through the informal exchange of intelligence between the representatives of fraternal socialist states.
May 18, 1983: The Intergovernmental Commission
The memorandum notes that the session of the Commission took place in Pyongyang. The formal output of these talks was solidified when the minutes were signed on 18 May 1983. The signatories represented the top tier of their respective governments' economic management: Deputy Premier N.V. Talizin signed for the Soviet Union, and Deputy Premier Gyae Eung-tae (also spelled Kyae Ung Tae) signed for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Such commissions were the primary mechanisms for managing the complex web of trade and technical exchange between Moscow and its allies. This specific body focused on the economic and scientific alignment of the two nations, operating under the broader umbrella of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the economic organization led by the Soviet Union that coordinated trade among Eastern Bloc countries and other communist states, according to the public record.
"Space Telecommunications and Space Research"
The core of Rudi's memorandum concerns a specific ambition of the North Korean government. During the session, the Koreans proposed that cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK be extended into the field of "space telecommunications and space research."
This request represents a significant leap in ambition for the DPRK. While the Soviet Union had already established a formidable space program, the request for "space telecommunications" suggests a desire for more than just theoretical research; it suggests a need for the practical hardware and satellite capabilities required to communicate and monitor across distances. In 1983, the ability to leverage space-based assets was a marker of geopolitical status and military utility.
The Soviet response, as relayed by Marushkin to Rudi, was not a rejection, but a conditional acceptance. The Soviet side stated that such cooperation was "possible only if the government of the DPRK joined the relevant international agreement."
Imre Rudi's Report
The document does not specify which "relevant international agreement" the Soviets were referring to. Based on the period, it is likely that Moscow was pushing Pyongyang toward the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 or other United Nations frameworks that governed the peaceful use of space. For the Soviets, providing high-level technical assistance in space research without the DPRK's adherence to international norms would have been a diplomatic risk, potentially exposing Moscow to international criticism or complicating its own relations with the West.
For Imre Rudi and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade, this detail was a pertinent piece of intelligence. Hungary's role as a commercial link within the Comecon system meant that the technical capabilities and aspirations of other member states—and their relationship with the Soviet hegemon—were critical for planning trade and diplomatic strategy. The memorandum captures a moment of negotiation where technical aspiration met geopolitical conditionality.
Related files on foreign economic policy from 1949 and human rights affairs from 1977–1980 exist within the State Department's FRUS archives, though they do not appear in this specific correspondence. What remains is the snapshot of a request for the stars, contingent upon a signature on a terrestrial treaty.
The memorandum leaves the outcome of the request unresolved. It does not record whether Deputy Premier Gyae Eung-tae agreed to the Soviet condition or which specific international agreement the Soviets had in mind.