Kim Il Sung pivoted from forceful liberation to 100,000-man troop cap
By Vera Kessler ·
East Berlin analysts watched Kim Il Sung shift from calls to forcefully liberate the south to a proposal for reducing armed forces to 100,000 men.
On May 2, 1963, the 1st Extra-European Department of the GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs produced a memorandum analyzing the reunification policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The document, available in an English translation from the Cold War International History Project, reads less like a diplomatic briefing and more like a critical audit of Pyongyang's strategic consistency. For the analysts in East Berlin, the record of the DPRK’s approach to the south was a study in contradiction, oscillating between a rigid legal fiction of a single state and the pragmatic acknowledgment of a divided reality.
Seoul as Capital
The memorandum begins by establishing the DPRK's official stance: that it is the sole legitimate government of the entire peninsula. According to the GDR analysts, Pyongyang based this claim on the August 25, 1948 elections, which the record claims saw a turnout of 99.97 percent in the north and 77.5 percent in the south. This legal claim is not merely rhetorical; it is embedded in the DPRK constitution.
Because the constitution lacks a preamble, the document notes that this "one-state-theory" is reflected in concrete provisions. Article 103 explicitly states, "The capital of the DPRK is Seoul." Similarly, Article 7 refers to land reform being conducted in "Korea's interior" at a time determined by the Supreme People's Assembly. In the eyes of the Pyongyang government, the Republic of Korea was not a state, but a territory "temporarily and illegally occupied by the United States."
A Meeting in Prague
Despite the constitutional insistence on a single state, the East Berlin report identifies moments where the DPRK’s diplomatic behavior betrayed its official line. The analysts point to a meeting of socialist states in Prague on June 25 and 26, 1957. During the preparations for the VIII UN Session, a DPRK representative argued that the unilateral admission of Syngman Rhee to the United Nations ignored the "de facto existence of two sovereign states in North and South Korea."
This admission created a gap between the DPRK's domestic constitution and its international maneuvering. The memorandum suggests that by 1960, Pyongyang had begun to move away from the one-state theory without explicitly admitting it. The proposal to build a Korean confederation—which would have maintained the current political systems and the autonomous operation of both governments—was, in the view of the GDR analysts, a realization that reunification would not happen "from one day to the next."
Forceful Liberation
The stability of this gradualist approach was shattered in 1961. The memorandum records that the DPRK initially misjudged the May 16 coup led by General Park Chung Hee, welcoming the fall of the Chang Myon government. It took a week for Pyongyang to re-evaluate the event as a "fascist military coup."
This shift triggered a period of "adventurism" between January and May 1962. The GDR analysts note a tendency toward "non-peaceful reunification," characterized by calls to violently overthrow the Park Chung Hee clique. On February 15, 1962, the United Patriotic Front of Korea issued a statement calling for the "forceful liberation" of the south.
The memorandum suggests this aggression was not an isolated whim but was "in sync with Chinese tactical considerations" and the People's Republic of China's military build-up in Eastern China against Taiwan. This bellicosity caused "grave concerns among the socialist countries," leading other young national states to lose faith in the DPRK's peaceful intentions.
100,000 Men
By June 1962, the DPRK pivoted back toward a peaceful resolution to repair its international reputation. The memorandum outlines a new, graduated sequence for rapprochement. First, it proposed a non-aggression treaty and a mutual reduction of armed forces to "100,000 men each" following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Only after the tension ended would the two sides establish an economic committee for cooperation in travel and trade.
This evolved model, outlined by Kim Il Sung in a government declaration on October 23, 1962, treated free elections not as the starting point, but as the final step of a lengthy process. In a September 1962 talk with a GDR delegation, Kim Il Sung observed that the majority of the South Korean population still believed their viability depended on aid from the Americans, the Japanese, and "West German monopolists."
The East Berlin analysts conclude that while the DPRK's proposals had become more realistic, they remained dependent on a specific internal catalyst in the south. The record states that the objective of a united front against American imperialism could only be achieved if the center of the movement in South Korea consisted of a Marxist-Leninist party.