Mao Zedong proposes 20-mile buffer zone to end Korean fighting

By Vera Kessler · August 13, 2026

Li Kenong was secretly dispatched to Kaesong to lead negotiations as Mao feared neutral observers would monitor Chinese military transport on the border and in Korea.

Ciphered Telegram No. 21405, dated July 3, 1951, travels from Beijing to the Second Main Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. It is addressed to Comrade Filippov for the attention of Joseph Stalin. In the text, Mao Zedong lays out five primary points for upcoming meetings between military representatives, attempting to calibrate a path toward a ceasefire in Korea that preserves security without conceding tactical ground.

Based on a published English translation from the Cold War International History Project, the record captures a moment of high-stakes negotiation where the technicalities of a border are treated as the primary lever of peace. Mao proposes a simultaneous ceasefire across land, sea, and air, suggesting that the "enemy"—the UN and South Korean forces—would likely accept this without qualification.

Ten English Miles

The most concrete spatial demand in the telegram is the creation of a buffer zone. Mao proposes that both sides withdraw their forces from the 38th parallel for a distance of "10 English miles," creating a twenty-mile wide strip of neutrality. The proposed arrangement for this zone is precise: the civil administration must remain exactly "as it was before 25.6.1950." This would leave the northern half of the buffer under the Korean People's government and the southern half under the South-Korean government.

Mao expresses confidence in this point, noting that it is "extremely just" and would be difficult for the opposition to refute. However, as the telegram progresses, the confidence shifts toward tactical uncertainty. When discussing the cessation of arms and troop transports into Korea, Mao asks Stalin if it might be "better to leave off the last part of our proposal" regarding the transport of reinforcements to the front lines. It is a small hesitation that suggests a desire to maintain a degree of operational flexibility even while proposing a halt to the war.

Li Kenong in Kaesong

The telegram highlights a recurring dilemma in Cold War diplomacy: the tension between taking the initiative and appearing over-eager. Mao proposes a control committee of neutral states to supervise the ceasefire, but he admits to Stalin that "there will be numerous difficulties in the fulfillment of this point." His specific fear is that neutral observers would "monitor our military transport on the Chinese-Korean border and at important communications points in Korea."

Mao weighs whether to propose the committee first or to wait for the enemy to suggest it, concluding that a total refusal to create such a committee would be "inadvisable." To manage these nuances, Mao reveals the deployment of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Kenong. According to the record, Li was dispatched to Korea with an arrival date of approximately July 5, 1951. After consulting with Kim Il Sung, Li was instructed to move to the area of Kaesong, where he would "secretly lead the negotiations."

Prisoners and Volunteers

The final points of the telegram deal with the human cost of the conflict: prisoners of war and refugees. Mao demands the full mutual exchange of all prisoners within four months. He anticipates that the opposing side will suggest a "one for one exchange," a proposal Mao intends to resist. He acknowledges a complicating factor: the enemy has captured a "relatively larger number of North Koreans," some of whom have already been incorporated into the South Korean troops.

Beyond the five main points, the record addresses the status of the Chinese forces. Mao suggests that all foreign troops, including "Chinese volunteer troops," must leave both North and South Korea within three to four months. He expresses concern that the opposing representatives might categorize this as a "political question" rather than a military one, thereby removing it from the immediate negotiations.

Finally, the telegram records a point of friction between Mao and Kim Il Sung. The North Korean leader insisted on the repatriation of refugees to their previous homes. Mao, however, describes this objective as "very difficult," fearing that the resulting arguments over refugees could "have an influence on the resolution of other important questions." He suggests that if the issue cannot be resolved quickly, it should be transferred to an international political conference.

Li Kenong was scheduled to arrive in Korea on July 5, 1951, to coordinate with Kim Il Sung before beginning the secret negotiations in Kaesong.