Four Members Flee to China as Kim Il Sung Betrays Purged Cadres

By Harlan Pryce · August 13, 2026

A secretary committed suicide and others were finished off through political means after Kim Il Sung ignored an agreement to protect dissidents from persecution.

Comrade Pimenov, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, spent the last days of March 1957 riding in a car toward Panmunjeom. He was accompanied by Henryk Brzezinski, the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, and Minister Brzostowski. As they traveled toward the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, Pimenov began to talk about the internal state of the North Korean leadership—not in the polished language of diplomatic cables, but in the stark terms of a party in the midst of a cleansing.

According to a published English translation of a Polish embassy record from the Cold War International History Project, the conversations took place during the journey and at the destination. Pimenov’s account details a systematic effort by Kim Il Sung to erase the influence of the Soviet-Koreans and those who dared to suggest that the party lacked "freedom of discussion."

Heo Ga-i’s Suicide

The first name Pimenov brought up was Heo Ga-i, a Secretary of the Central Committee who had arrived in Korea from the Soviet Union. Heo had been accused of attempting to "appropriate power for himself" following the fourth plenum toward the end of the war. The official charge was a lack of party discipline and the excessive removal of members from the party rolls. Heo committed suicide, an act that his Korean colleagues dismissed as a "deed unworthy of a communist," suggesting he simply feared the disclosure of the secrets that burdened him.

This was not an isolated event, but part of a broader friction between the local population and the Soviet arrivals. Pimenov noted that by early 1956, anti-Soviet sentiment had grown among the "broad masses," born from the bottom. The cause was simple: the Soviet-Koreans held the highest-paying positions and their way of life differed from the nation, creating a social rift.

Others followed Heo into oblivion or isolation. Pak Il-u, a minister of communications from the Chinese-active faction, was removed and placed under house arrest for his attitude toward those from the Soviet Union. Then there was Vice-minister of Culture Jeong Ryul, who promoted the idea that "everything that is Soviet is good and right" while denying the Korean cultural heritage. In December 1955, Kim Il Sung sharply condemned this cultural sycophancy, and Jeong was replaced by a new vice-minister who had attended the Higher Party School in the USSR.

"Off the podium with you!"

The real crisis emerged after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A group of party activists began criticizing the method of educating cadres and the absence of internal debate. They timed their activity to coincide with the absence of the Korean government delegation in other people’s democracies. When the delegation returned around July 20, 1956, the movement was reported to Kim Il Sung.

What followed was a masterclass in isolation. Before the August plenum, Central Committee members suspected of supporting the group were summoned for talks. The goal was not deliberation, but pressure. When the plenum finally convened on August 30 and 31, the dissidents were denied the right to speak. Instead, they were met with general shouting: "off the podium with you!"

On the second day, four members of this group fled to China. Despite the demands of the DPRK, the Chinese government refused to return them. The remaining sympathizers were expelled from the party under a stern resolution.

By September, following unofficial visits from Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, a new resolution was passed. It appeared to offer a reprieve; the purged members were readmitted, and an agreement was made that they would not be persecuted. Pimenov, however, informed the Polish diplomats that this agreement was not being honored. The press remained silent on the resolutions, and those who had spoken out in August were being "finished off by various methods" through political and administrative means.

A Recall to Moscow

The shift in power was mirrored by the physical departure of Soviet influence. Pimenov emphasized that the Korean comrades were demanding the recall of nearly all Soviet advisers. By April 1957, only two remained: a military adviser and one from the State Commission for Economic Planning, the latter staying only until the five-year plan deadline in May. The military adviser was expected to be recalled shortly, to be replaced by a standard Military Attaché office.

While the Soviet presence shrank, the DPRK continued to probe for diplomatic openings. General Jeong Geuk-rok told Pimenov about a ninety-minute meeting in October 1956 with General An of South Korea, organized with Swedish assistance. They discussed the reunifying of Korea, and Jeong viewed the meeting positively. However, the process stalled. Jeong believed the Americans had "become mixed up in the matter," and the situation was further strained by a South Korean airplane being shot down in the north.

As the trip to Panmunjeom concluded, Pimenov mentioned the case of Construction Minister Kim Seung-hwa. A member of the dissident group, Kim had been too popular to be purged administratively, so he was sent to the Higher Party School in the USSR. Once he was out of the country, the press began to vilify him. Pimenov noted that it would not be strange if Kim Seung-hwa were to follow the example of former Ambassador Ri Sang-jo and ask for asylum.

At the time of the report, the only remaining thread of cooperation was a pending agreement on scientific-technical cooperation, with the USSR and the DPRK still negotiating the terms of what could be offered and what was demanded.