Prague Warns North Korean Nuclear Weapons Could Spark Global War
By Roy Castellano ·
Prague feared North Korea was equipping itself with nuclear weapons and risking global war while Budapest dismissed the alarm as a tactic to sound out Jimmy Carter's plans.
On February 14, First Secretary Lehocky of Czechoslovakia requested a meeting with András Forgács of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. According to an English translation of a Hungarian memorandum from the Wilson Center Digital Archive, the conversation focused on a specific piece of diplomatic friction: a declaration issued by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on January 25, along with a corresponding four-point proposal.
Lehocky arrived with instructions from his center in Prague, conveying a sense of urgency and apprehension. The Czechoslovak embassy in Pyongyang had analyzed the North Korean text and found it to be written in an "extremely threatening tone." The primary concern for the Czechoslovaks was the escalation of rhetoric regarding the Korean peninsula, which Lehocky noted was described in a way that suggested it "might directly lead to the outbreak of a global nuclear war."
A Global Nuclear War
For the Czechoslovak delegation, the January 25 declaration was not merely a diplomatic salvo but a signal of material change. Lehocky told Forgács that the document contained a "veiled reference" to the fact that the DPRK was actively equipping itself with nuclear weapons. In the eyes of Prague, this was a dangerous gambit. The Czechoslovaks observed that the North Korean government had launched an international campaign to secure support for its proposals, and they anticipated that Pyongyang would soon ask other socialist countries to issue official statements of support for the four-point declaration.
Lehocky was explicit about his government's position: the Czechoslovak side "could hardly fulfill a request of such nature." This suggests a significant rift in how the Eastern Bloc viewed the volatility of Kim Il Sung's regime. While the socialist camp often projected a facade of monolithic unity—a goal later echoed in the 1992 Pyongyang Declaration where 69 parties vowing to "safeguard socialism" met for Kim Il Sung's 80th birthday—the internal reality of the 1970s was one of fragmented risk assessment.
Carter's Korea Policy
András Forgács responded to Lehocky's alarm with a notable lack of urgency. Where the Czechoslovaks saw a nuclear threat, Forgács saw a predictable tactical maneuver. He informed Lehocky that he had "not noticed any fundamentally new element in the tone and contents of the declaration."
From the Hungarian perspective, the DPRK's initiative was not a prelude to war, but a calculated response to the political climate in Washington and Seoul. Forgács argued that the declaration was intended to counter a recent "proposal" from the South Korean regime, which suggested that the two Koreas conclude a non-aggression pact paired with the withdrawal of American troops. Furthermore, Forgács viewed the DPRK's rhetoric as a tool to "sound out the Carter administration's plans for Korea."
By framing the DPRK's actions as a reaction to Jimmy Carter's foreign policy rather than an independent drive toward nuclear proliferation, the Hungarian side effectively minimized the risk that had terrified the Czechoslovaks. Forgács treated the "threatening tone" as a diplomatic dialect, a way for Pyongyang to leverage its position against the United States and South Korea.
Positive Comments in the Press
While Czechoslovakia was contemplating how to avoid endorsing the four-point proposal, Hungary had already moved in the opposite direction. Forgács revealed to Lehocky that Deputy Foreign Minister Házi had already hosted the DPRK ambassador in Budapest.
During that meeting, Házi had gone beyond mere acknowledgement of the January 25 declaration. He informed the ambassador that the declaration had been described in the Hungarian press with "positive comments" immediately following its publication. Házi had "repeatedly assured" the ambassador of Hungary's support for the "struggle for the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea."
This divergence in approach—Prague's caution versus Budapest's public alignment—highlights the differing diplomatic appetites within the Warsaw Pact. Hungary appeared willing to offer rhetorical support to Pyongyang to maintain ties and perhaps signal its own independence in managing regional relations, even as its neighbors feared the consequences of North Korean nuclear ambitions.
Despite the positive reception in Budapest and the assurances from Deputy Minister Házi, the record shows a surprising lack of a formal demand. When the DPRK ambassador met with the Hungarian officials, he did not actually ask the Hungarian government to make an official statement. He accepted the positive press coverage and the private assurances, leaving the official diplomatic record blank.