Pyongyang Spurns Moscow After Soviets Deny Modern Missiles

By Vera Kessler · August 14, 2026

North Korea armed its general population without military need and called the Berlin Wall a half-hearted measure as it abandoned Soviet assurances for Chinese positions.

A memorandum dated 8 April 1963, written by the SED Central Committee’s Department of International Relations and translated by the Cold War International History Project, describes a pivot in Pyongyang. The document, signed by Department Head Schneidewind and Associate Stark, records the transition of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) from a middle-ground position to one of "complete congruence" with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

For the analysts in East Berlin, the shift was not merely ideological but systemic. They trace the drift toward Beijing through the lens of the XXII CPSU Party Congress of 1961, noting that while Pyongyang initially recognized the leading role of the Soviet Union, it began to employ "opportunistic positions" to avoid taking sides in the growing schism between Moscow and Beijing.

"Internal Matter of the CPSU"

When the Soviet Union addressed the cult of personality and the "anti-party group" during the XXII Congress, the WPK refused to condemn Stalin or align with the Soviet critique. According to the GDR report, the WPK evaded a firm Marxist standpoint by claiming that the assessment of Stalin's rule was an "internal matter of the CPSU."

This refusal to intervene in the internal affairs of "fraternal parties" was framed as a basic principle of mutual relations. However, the East German analysts saw this as a shield. By declaring that the issue of Stalin "is not the concern of our party," Pyongyang created a diplomatic vacuum that the CCP was quick to fill. The report notes that the WPK's refusal to condemn Albanian leaders—treating their clash with Moscow merely as "differences of opinion"—further signaled a departure from the Soviet orbit.

Gun in One Hand

By 1962, the report claims the WPK had "completely moved towards Chinese positions." This alignment manifested in a rejection of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, replaced by a more aggressive, adventurist posture. The party newspaper Rodong Sinmun began publishing claims that peace could only be preserved through a "committed and persistent struggle," rather than by "begging" the imperialists.

This rhetoric peaked with a focus on the "revolutionary spirit," which the record asserts the WPK viewed as "more powerful than any atomic bomb or missile." This ideology underpinned the decision at the 5th Plenum of the WPK to arm the general population. The report explicitly links this militarization to an Albanian slogan: "The gun in one hand, hammer and sickle in the other hand." The GDR analysts were blunt, stating that the decision to arm the people was "not based in any military need whatsoever," but served to discredit the policy of peaceful reunification.

Berlin and the Missiles

The friction extended to the heart of the Cold War's most volatile flashpoints. In September 1962, Deputy Prime Minister Ri Ju-yeon told a GDR delegation that the construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, had been a "half-hearted measure." Ri suggested that negotiations were fruitless and that the time had come to "close the deal in Berlin," betting that the imperialists would not go to war over the city.

Simultaneously, Pyongyang's relationship with Moscow soured over hardware and geopolitics. The report highlights a growing distrust fueled by the Soviet Union's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In WPK meetings, officials argued that because of the Soviet "retreat" in Cuba and the "rejection to provide modern missiles to the DPRK," Soviet assurances were no longer believable.

This hostility leaked into state-to-state relations with East Germany. The memorandum lists several indicators of a "cooling" relationship: the withdrawal of North Korean students from the GDR in 1962, a refusal to attend the Leipzig Fair, and the imposition of limitations on the working conditions of the GDR Embassy in Pyongyang.

Artels and Incentives

Despite the political alignment with Beijing, the report identifies a stubborn divergence in domestic administration. The WPK did not adopt the Chinese model of people's communes, continuing instead to rely on Soviet-style cooperatives known as Artels. Furthermore, Pyongyang maintained the use of "material incentives" in its economic policy, a practice at odds with the more rigid Chinese approach.

While the WPK promoted the nationalist slogan "everything through our own force"—which the analysts claim led to a rejection of cooperation within Comecon—they remained tethered to the Soviet Union through trade. The report concludes by noting that the DPRK had signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union featuring "higher numbers than the one it signed China," and had likewise secured a favorable trade agreement with the GDR for 1963.