Moscow sought 4,000 soldiers and Romanian air corridors while bargaining with Washington

By Roy Castellano · August 14, 2026

Nicolae Ceausescu resisted Soviet efforts to treat Romania as a province while Deng Xiaoping warned that Moscow was trading North Vietnamese neutrality for American concessions.

July 26, 1965. Bucharest. The air in the room is thick with the performative warmth of socialist diplomacy. Nicolae Ceausescu, the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, begins the session by asking if his guests had a good rest. Deng Xiaoping, then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, responds with the requisite compliments, praising the "success" of Romania's 9th Congress and the "correctness" of the party line.

This is a stenographic transcript of the discussions, published by the Cold War International History Project. On the surface, it is a record of "comradely" friendship. Underneath, it is a manual on the fragility of the Eastern Bloc. The dialogue exposes a deep, jagged rift between Beijing, Bucharest, and Moscow, centered on the tension between national sovereignty and the heavy hand of Soviet command.

Airports and Air Corridors

The pleasantries vanish when the conversation turns to Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping does not mince words regarding the Soviet Union's approach to the conflict. He informs Ceausescu that the Soviets had requested the use of one or two Romanian airports to station 500 soldiers and requested an air corridor over Romanian territory to reach Vietnam. Moscow also intended to send 4,000 soldiers specialized in remote-controlled missiles.

According to the transcript, Romania refused. Deng notes that because of this refusal, the Soviets accused Romania of "not wanting the Soviet Union to help Vietnam." The Chinese delegation views this not as a strategic disagreement, but as a violation of sovereignty. Kan Shen, a member of the Chinese Secretariat, is blunt: "The Soviets do not respect the sovereignty of our country; in order to discuss this issue with us, they sent only their embassy's counselor; they look upon our country as a province of the Soviet Union."

More damning is the Chinese claim that Moscow was playing a double game with Washington. Deng alleges that the Soviet Union proposed the "neutralization" of both South and North Vietnam—essentially the neutralization of a socialist state—during negotiations with the United States. He cites diplomatic contacts involving Averell Harriman, suggesting that Moscow was "bargaining" with the Americans. The Chinese view these "common actions" proposed by the Soviets not as genuine aid to Hanoi, but as a mechanism to isolate China and maintain a superpower equilibrium with the United States at the expense of their smaller allies.

"Tomatoes and Cucumbers"

There is a striking moment of strategic kinship between the Chinese and the Romanians regarding the concept of isolation. In the public record, the Romanian Communist Party—established in 1921 and ruling since 1947—had begun moving toward a brand of "national communism," distancing itself from the strict dictates of the Kremlin.

Deng Xiaoping observes that the Soviets attempt to isolate China, but he suggests that isolation is not inherently a failure. He points to Romania's own friction within the framework of COMECON. In a rare flash of dry humor, Deng remarks, "As a result of your isolation you have more tomatoes and cucumbers than others."

It is a calculated endorsement of economic autonomy. The Chinese leader recognizes that by resisting the Soviet center, Romania had managed to retain more control over its own production and resources. For Ceausescu, this was the core of his project: the "necessity of industrialization" and the "national role." He tells Deng that the idea of nations merging or becoming obsolete is "wrong and dangerous." In the logic of the strongman, the nation-state is the only reliable shield against a neighboring empire, even one that shares the same ideological handbook.

The Sokolovsky Manual

The discussion eventually shifts to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the nature of military command. Ceausescu and Ion Gheorghe Maurer insist that the relationship between socialist armies must be one of "collaboration, of cooperation, not of subordination." They are reacting to the reality that the military high command was, in practice, entirely Soviet.

To illustrate the danger, Kan Shen brings up a specific text: Military Strategy, edited by Marshal Sokolovsky. This book, used in Soviet military academies, allegedly stated that in the event of a war against "the imperialists," all socialist armies would be subordinated to the command of the Soviet Union.

For a targeting and war-plans analyst, this is the only part of the transcript that truly matters. The Sokolovsky manual is not just a textbook; it is a statement of intent. It envisions a unified command structure where national armies are reduced to auxiliary units of the Soviet war machine. Ceausescu argues that for a mobilization of the people to be effective, it must be performed by "independent" national forces.

Deng agrees, citing the Chinese experience in Korea, where they drew up battle plans with the Koreans without demanding total subordination. He notes that China is the larger power in that relationship, yet still respected the local command to some degree. He tells Ceausescu, "Your experience is richer than ours because you came across such problems within the framework of COMECON and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization."

Related files on these tensions exist in the archives of the NSArchive and the CIA's European Review, though they are not part of this record. The transcript itself terminates abruptly, mid-sentence, as Deng begins to reflect on the Romanian struggle against Soviet pressure: "We know that you have fought and think that t"