Zhao Ziyang admits Great Leap caused severe slumps
By Roy Castellano ·
Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea stalled Moscow ties as Zhao Ziyang admitted the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution were plagued by too much haste and rashness.
Todor Zhivkov arrived in Beijing on May 6, 1987, for his first personal visit to China and the first top-level visit from Bulgaria. The transcript of the conversation between Zhivkov and Zhao Ziyang, Acting Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, begins with a brief, almost banal observation on population. When Zhao remarks that Zhivkov has likely not seen as many people in Sofia as there are in Beijing, Zhivkov admits he expected the city to be like an "anthill."
It is a telling start to a meeting between two men attempting to manage the decline and contradictions of the socialist experiment. According to the published English translation from the Cold War International History Project, Zhivkov spent the opening of the dialogue positioning Bulgaria not as a satellite, but as a strategic pivot.
NATO's South Flank
Zhivkov describes Bulgaria as being situated in a "very sensitive region," caught between the Warsaw Pact, other socialist states, and the "capitalist countries, members of NATO and the Common Market." He is acutely aware that part of NATO's south flank rests there. In a bid to project influence beyond his country's limited size, Zhivkov argues that "no Balkan question can be resolved without Bulgaria."
He outlines a policy of normalization with Turkey and suggests transforming the Balkans into a zone free of both nuclear and chemical weapons. To a targeting analyst, this reads as a classic diplomatic gambit—the smaller power proposing a "neutral zone" to reduce the pressure of superpower encirclement while attempting to maintain its own regional relevance. Zhivkov acknowledges the disparity in power with a humble metaphor, noting, "Your church tower is bigger. Ours is a small one."
"Great leaps are normally followed by severe slumps"
Zhao Ziyang’s response is a mixture of diplomatic courtesy and startling candor regarding China's internal failures. While he praises Zhivkov's economic growth and his theoretical concepts of socialist ownership, Zhao spends a significant portion of the meeting auditing the disasters of the previous three decades.
Zhao admits that China suffered from "too much haste and rashness" in its economic development, specifically citing the "Great Leap." He observes bluntly that "great leaps are normally followed by severe slumps," and that China had gone through such cycles several times. He further characterizes the Cultural Revolution as "too hasty a measure," describing it as the result of a "leftist policy" plagued by too many political movements.
This admission of systemic instability is contrasted with the "stable and normal rate of economic development" Zhao attributes to Bulgaria. It is a rare moment of archival honesty, where a high-ranking party official acknowledges that the ideological drive for rapid transformation had produced only volatility and failure. Zhao points to the third plenum of 1978 as the turning point, where China adopted a program of building socialism in a "specifically Chinese manner," anchored by the leadership of the party and the "socialist road of development."
Vietnam in Kampuchea
When the conversation shifts to disarmament, Zhao recognizes the reality of the nuclear hierarchy. He notes that the Soviet Union and the United States possess "over 95 percent of the nuclear arms in the world" and are the only two actors capable of meaningful reduction. While China claims to be sincere about disarmament and argues that its own military expenditures are low, Zhao makes it clear that China will only take its part of the responsibility after the two superpowers have acted.
The central tension of the meeting, however, is the "Kampuchea problem." Zhao is explicit: the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union is stalled because the Soviet Union supports the "intrusion of Vietnamese troops into Kampuchea," while China supports the resistance. Zhao describes the Vietnamese occupation of a "weaker neighboring country" as an act that cannot be considered correct, asserting that unless Vietnam withdraws its troops, progress with Moscow is unlikely.
Zhivkov, playing the role of the elder statesman and "veteran of the communist movement," attempts to mediate. He reminds Zhao that he was the first general secretary to visit Kampuchea in 1979 and suggests that dialogue is the only tool for resolution. He urges Zhao to let the two great socialist powers "stand above these problems," arguing that regional conflicts should not be a prerequisite for regulating broader relations. He pleads for a settlement within his own "life span," admitting this wish might sound egoistic.
Zhivkov closes his plea by referencing the legacy of Georgi Dimitrov, claiming that if not for the conflict over Kampuchea, China would be the most popular country in Bulgaria after the Soviet Union. He suggests that "the dead save the living" and urges both sides not to let dead issues pull them downward.
Zhao Ziyang did not offer a policy shift in response, only a polite social gesture. "After listening to your statement my wish to visit your country increased," he replied.