East Berlin Plotted to Dismantle NATO in 1969

By Vera Kessler ·

West German imperialism was targeted for isolation as East Berlin used an offensive policy of peace to shift the balance of power in favor of socialism.

The main goal of the European policy of the states closely linked with the Soviet Union is to change the balance of power in favour of socialism.

That is how the document begins. There is no ambiguity, no diplomatic hedging, and no pretense of neutral mediation. This is a piece of working material from October 10, 1969, produced by the Department for Analysis, Planning and Prognosis. In this English translation published by the Cold War International History Project, the machinery of East German strategic thought is laid bare, revealing that the drive for a European security conference was never merely about avoiding war, but about winning a systemic struggle.

"Change the balance of power"

For the authors of this memo, the pursuit of a security system was a tactical instrument. The objective was to establish "peaceful coexistence" not as an end in itself, but as a means to create the "best external conditions for the development of the socialist social system in Europe." The strategy was an "offensive policy of peace."

According to the text, the long-term goals were explicit: the roll-back of NATO's influence and the "eventual overcoming of this aggressive alliance system." The memo lists the isolation of "West German imperialism" as a primary objective and views the prevention of Western European political integration as a necessity. The conference was to be the lever used to exploit "contradictions among the states of the capitalist system."

This document provides the internal logic for what would eventually become the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Public records, including the Wikipedia lead on the CSCE, describe the process as a key element of détente intended to minimize tensions and improve human rights. But the 1969 memo suggests that, from the East Berlin perspective, the conference was a vehicle for a "step-by-step implementation" of socialist goals.

10 October 1969

Central to this strategy was the legal and political status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The memo lists the "comprehensive recognition of the territorial status quo" and the recognition of the GDR according to international law as non-negotiable preconditions. Specifically, it demands the surrender of the West German Alleinvertretungsanspruch—the claim that Bonn was the sole representative of all Germans.

The analysts viewed West Germany's approach as "negative and ambiguous." They noted with some cynicism that while the CDU/CSU resisted the conference, the SPD attempted to use Ostpolitik to establish relations with socialist states while specifically excluding the GDR. To counter this, the memo argues that the GDR must maintain the principle that "unless the GDR participates on the basis of equal rights, a European Security Conference cannot take place."

There was also a calculated approach to the actual content of any resulting agreements. The memo suggests that the establishment of the conference and its agenda carried "a higher political relevance than the contents of the documents do in themselves." The strategy was to move through "general declarative agreements" to eventually reach "more precise and legally binding resolutions." In essence, the act of convening the conference was the victory; the fine print could be managed later.

The Yugoslav Variable

While the memo projects a front of socialist unity, it reveals significant friction within the bloc. The Soviet Union is acknowledged as holding the "leading role," but the interests of the satellite states were fragmented.

Then there was Yugoslavia. As a state not participating in the Warsaw Pact's multilateral consultations, Yugoslavia was expected to arrive at the conference with its own concepts. The memo anticipates that Belgrade would demand the dissolution of military alliances and emphasize sovereignty and non-interference—even in the relations between socialist states. The analysts noted a certain degree of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Romania, both of whom leaned toward an "exaggerated emphasis of détente trends."

Tactical Presumptions

The document concludes with a focus on GDR strategy. The goal was to maximize the "political-psychological effect" of the socialist offensive for peace. By establishing facts quickly through socialist proposals, East Berlin hoped to prevent the West from making counter-proposals and to diminish the influence of "imperialist interpretation."

There are related files on this subject held in other archives, including the UK National Archives (DEFE 13/2239, FCO 41/889, and FCO 41/888) and the US National Archives (NAID 473986796), though those records remain separate from this specific planning memo.

The 1969 material leaves one question hanging: to what extent did the eventual 1975 Helsinki Accords reflect these original socialist ambitions, and to what extent did the "general declarative agreements" ultimately work against the GDR by opening the door to the human rights monitoring the bloc feared? For now, the record remains a study in the cold application of political leverage, ending on the insistence that the GDR's equality was the only possible starting point for a new Europe.