Moscow plotted to shatter NATO and isolate West Germany by 1969

By Vera Kessler ·

Moscow worked to erode the Western pact system by buying off economic elites and splitting the SPD from its working-class base to force a NATO exit by 1969.

On 26 April 1968, Arno Goede, Director of the Soviet Union Department at the East German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent an internal notification to his colleagues Dr. Hans Voss and Dr. Ingo Oeser. The document, an English translation of a German original published by the Cold War International History Project, attaches a briefing titled "Current essential questions in the Soviet Union's politics for guaranteeing European security."

Goede was not sending a mere update; he was soliciting written opinions by May 2 on the conclusions regarding Soviet strategy. The briefing portrays a Moscow that views Europe as "the central point in the confrontation between socialism and capitalism," with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) serving as the "Western outpost of the socialist camp."

"Ideological Diversion" According to the briefing, the Soviet Union's primary objectives were the further international recognition of the GDR and the "isolation of West German imperialism." To achieve this, Moscow viewed the internal politics of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a primary theater of operation.

The document specifically targets the "Neue Ostpolitik" (the new Eastern policy) declared on 8 December 1967. The Soviet position was not merely disagreement, but a drive toward "immediate unmasking and rejection." The briefing describes Ostpolitik as a form of "ideological diversion," citing a Central Committee resolution from 10 April 1968 which claimed that imperialism was seeking the "political and ideological undermining of the socialist states, against the communist and general democratic movement."

The strategy extended to the domestic politics of West Germany. The text explicitly mentions the need to "unmask" the role of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leaders within the Grand Coalition. This indicates a tactical attempt to drive a wedge between the SPD and its working-class base, framing the coalition as a betrayal of socialist principles.

Western European Ties Beyond the German border, the Soviet Union pursued a "long-term programme" to weaken the Western pact system from within. This approach was not based on immediate confrontation but on a calculated, gradual erosion of influence. The briefing's layout includes several gaps in the record, but the remaining text outlines three specific goals for relations with Western European states:

A key mechanism for this erosion was economic. The Soviet Union sought to tie "highly influential economic elites" to Moscow through cooperation, effectively creating a pro-Soviet or at least neutral lobby within the capitals of Western Europe. By doing so, the USSR hoped to complicate the internal cohesion of both NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC).

The 1969 Deadline One of the most concrete timelines mentioned in the notification concerns the North Atlantic Treaty. The briefing notes that the Soviet Union supported forces pleading for their respective states to exit NATO in 1969.

This timing was not accidental. The original NATO Treaty was due for renewal in 1969. Moscow saw an opportunity to exploit existing frictions within the alliance—frictions that had been exacerbated by events such as France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in 1966. The record suggests that the Soviet Union viewed the 1968 protest-generation and Gaullist challenges to NATO's unity as useful catalysts for this exit.

While the Soviet Union worked to fracture the alliance, it simultaneously maintained a public offer to conclude an agreement of mutual non-aggression between the Warsaw Treaty states and NATO states. This dual-track approach—destabilizing the alliance internally while offering a formal peace gesture—was designed to maximize Soviet leverage while maintaining the territorial status quo and preventing West German plans for a revision of the results of the Second World War.

The internal notification ends with this contradiction: a push for the "isolation of West German imperialism" and the dismantling of NATO, paired with a diplomatic offer of non-aggression.

The record leaves open how the GDR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs actually responded to Goede's request for opinion. While the notification asks for written feedback by 2 May, those responses are not included in this file. It remains to be seen whether Voss and Oeser agreed with the assessment that the "unmasking" of the SPD was the most effective path forward, or if they viewed the "bridge building" of US global strategy as a more significant threat than West German Ostpolitik.