Todor Zhivkov cites 1.2 million Bulgarians missing from Macedonia records
By Roy Castellano ·
1.2 million Bulgarians were simply no longer mentioned in records after World War II as Todor Zhivkov warned Indira Gandhi that NATO forces in Europe created a disastrous situation.
Delhi. January 24, 1969. 11:30 A.M. The meeting between the president of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, and the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, began with the customary diplomatic warmth. However, the published English translation of the minutes from the Cold War International History Project shows that the pleasantries quickly gave way to a cold-eyed assessment of the global map, from the jungles of Southeast Asia to the riverbeds of the Balkans.
"An Artificial Force"
Prime Minister Gandhi opened the international segment of the talks by addressing the fragility of Southeast Asia. While she noted that Vietnam had "advanced a small step ahead," she remained skeptical of the American presence in the region. She described the aid provided by the United States to neighboring countries as "an artificial force," suggesting that the only way to settle regional problems without such external coercion was through peaceful means.
Gandhi’s concerns were not merely theoretical. She reported to Zhivkov that during a recent conference of the British Commonwealth in London, the prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore had expressed a desire for new defense capabilities or agreements because they "didn't feel safe enough." Gandhi viewed these potential alliances as catalysts for tension. Her approach was one of non-alignment, a strategy of maintaining distance from the great power blocs while attempting to foster a counter-influence in Latin America, where she believed countries were trying to "free themselves" from the American sphere.
Soviet Weaponry in Vietnam
Zhivkov’s response to the Vietnam situation was devoid of Gandhi’s diplomatic phrasing. He was blunt about the disparity of power, noting that the United States economy was "900 times bigger" than that of Vietnam. In his view, the Vietnamese survival was not a matter of bravery alone, but a matter of logistics. He stated plainly that the "major help is offered by the Soviet Union, since Vietnam is fighting with Soviet weaponry," and admitted that he could "hardly imagine Vietnam's successes without the Soviet help."
This was the reality of the era: the proxy war was a test of Soviet industrial output against American treasury. Zhivkov believed a political settlement was inevitable, provided the Americans were pushed to withdraw their armed forces. He noted that the U.S. would likely only leave once they could ensure the Vietnamese were provided for economically.
Turning to Europe, Zhivkov’s tone shifted to the strategic anxiety of a man living in the shadow of a potential Third World War. He described the concentration of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe as a "dangerous situation," noting that any change in the balance of power would be "disastrous." He specifically identified "revenge-seeking forces" in West Germany as the primary agents complicating the international situation. While related files in the State Department's FRUS index for Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean cover this period, Zhivkov’s personal remarks highlight a deep-seated fear of a renewed conflict on the European continent.
Macedonia and Tito
On the Balkans, Zhivkov played the part of the regional stabilizer, though his words carried a veiled threat. He reminded Gandhi that Bulgaria is the geographic center of the peninsula, and that the major rivers in Turkey and Greece originate in Bulgarian territory. He noted that Bulgaria "can turn the rivers for Turkey and Greece back," though he added that they would not do so, suggesting instead a joint effort for water management. It was a reminder that geography is the only permanent asset in war-planning.
Much of the discussion then turned to Bulgaria’s fraught relationship with Yugoslavia and the "Macedonian Question." Zhivkov acknowledged that nationalist circles in Yugoslavia had used the issue to aggravate relations. He cited previous statistics—Turkish and Serbian—that spoke of 1,200,000 Bulgarians living in Macedonia, noting that after World War II, the Bulgarian population there was simply no longer mentioned.
Despite these tensions, Zhivkov claimed he had reached an agreement with Josip Broz Tito that the Macedonian issue should be left to historians and scholars rather than being dealt with politically. He characterized the relationship with Romania as "marvelous," though he admitted that he and Nicolae Ceaușescu held diverging opinions on international issues, which they discussed openly while going hunting together.
Zhivkov concluded his presentation by admitting he was not well acquainted with Asian affairs, though he agreed with Gandhi’s opposition to the creation of military groups in the region. He expressed a desire to restore the "old friendship and cooperation" with China, though he admitted trade and relations were currently underdeveloped.
The meeting adjourned at 1:00 P.M. after a brief exchange on the need to improve economic relations.