Kim Il Sung's state seized half their crops, driving peasants to suicide
By Vera Kessler ·
Peasants faced brute force grain seizures and lost their reserves while secret-mongering and careerists kept the leadership insulated from reality.
On 12 April, Dr. László Keresztes, the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Pyongyang, visited Soviet Counselor A.M. Petrov. Keresztes had come seeking advice on the internal politics of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, specifically regarding issues he did not see clearly: the lack of self-criticism, the persistence of the personality cult, and a culture of "secret-mongering."
This exchange is recorded in an English translation of a report from the Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, published by the Cold War International History Project. In the document, Petrov offers his personal opinion on the state of the DPRK under Kim Il Sung, the revolutionary who founded the state in 1948 and led it until 1994, according to the public record.
Criticism Directed Downwards
Petrov’s assessment of the DPRK’s political climate was bleak. While the socialist ideal of "criticism and self-criticism" was spoken of, Petrov noted that it was rarely practiced. When it did occur, he observed that "criticism was directed primarily downwards, there was barely any criticism directed upwards." This asymmetry left the leadership insulated from reality.
Petrov argued that Kim Il Sung was surrounded by "boot-lickers and careerists" who accepted every word of the leader "without any dispute." This lack of dissent meant that mistakes were not revealed openly, but only "in private and belatedly," and that no one was ever held responsible for them. In Petrov's view, the personality cult was not merely a social phenomenon but a "primary and decisive factor in every mistake."
2.3 Million Metric Tons
This insulation from truth manifested most dangerously in the DPRK's agricultural planning. The report describes a pattern of unrealistic and exaggerated targets. For 1955, the grain crop target was set at 4 million metric tons—nearly double the 1954 crop—without any corresponding increase in investment. Only after reminders was the target lowered to a more realistic 2.7 million.
More critical was the misreporting of the previous year. Based on "embellished and false reports," the 1954 crop had been estimated at 3 million metric tons. The actual figure, which the government eventually admitted, was 2.3 million, though the report notes it is possible that even this lower figure was incorrect.
Because the state based its compulsory deliveries on these inflated numbers, the impact on the rural population was severe. In many areas, the state took as much as 50 percent of the crop from the peasantry by "brute force," far exceeding the legal tax in kind of 23 to 27 percent. The result was a peasantry left with almost no grain reserves.
The document notes that "public feeling rapidly deteriorated" in the countryside, leading to "strongly dissenting voices" and a number of suicides. To mitigate the crisis, the DPRK purchased 200 thousand metric tons of grain from China and the Soviet Union and provided some grain back to the peasantry as loans. Additionally, the pace of cooperativization was noted as "far too rapid," with 30 percent of the peasantry joining cooperatives in a single year, often through the use of force.
1500 Won and a Necktie
While Petrov acknowledged the "undeniable success of reconstruction" following the Korean War, he highlighted a stark disconnect between industrial growth and the standard of living. The average monthly wage for a factory worker of undistinguished performance was 1500 won. Against this, a meter of linen cost 300 won, and a necktie cost between 300 and 500 won.
For the vast majority of workers, rations consisted of nothing but rice; only a "very narrow stratum" received anything else. The report suggests that the DPRK leadership viewed foreign aid as a primary source of supply, expecting other countries to "give them everything." This is evidenced by the government's rejection of a Soviet offer to replace some of the equipment in a one billion ruble aid program with consumer goods. The DPRK insisted on equipment instead, ignoring local raw materials and secondary products of heavy industry that could have been used to produce consumer goods.
The document concludes by noting that despite the emergence of a new generation, the state suffered from a "very great shortage of leading cadres and technical experts."