Soviets deny North Korea nuclear plant and 350,000 metric tons of fuel
By Roy Castellano ·
North Korea faced a difficult economic situation as Soviet officials issued verbal rejections to avoid creating a formal record of promised energy aid or nuclear power.
In February 1976, during a session of the Soviet-Korean Intergovernmental Economic, Technical, and Scientific Consultative Commission, the North Korean delegation attempted to secure a concrete commitment for the future of its energy sector. According to a published English translation from the Cold War International History Project of a report sent by the Hungarian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, the head of the Korean delegation, Deputy Premier Kang Jin-tae, handed a letter from Pak Seong-cheol to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin.
The letter contained three specific demands. First, the DPRK sought a modification to a 1973 agreement regarding the supply of rollers for the Kim Chaek industrial combine. Second, they requested the construction of four additional blocs, each with an output of 100,000 kw, at the Bukchang thermal power plant. Third, and most ambitiously, the Soviet Union was asked to construct a nuclear power plant within the DPRK.
"Before the 1980s"
The Soviet response was characterized by a calculated lack of immediacy. The report notes that the Soviet side initially provided no concrete reply. When the negotiating delegation finally addressed the requests for the nuclear plant and the Bukchang extension, they took a position that effectively kicked the can down the road, stating they could not discuss these two issues "before the 1980s."
By October 1976, the urgency of these ambitions had already begun to erode. North Korean Minister of Foreign Trade Gae Eung-tae, stopping in Moscow while returning from a tour of Africa, pushed for a formal response to Pak Seong-cheol’s letter. However, the record indicates a shift in Pyongyang's priorities: the construction of a nuclear power plant was "already missing from the list of urgent questions." Gae was given a vague promise that an official reply would follow as soon as possible.
November 12
The official reply, when it finally arrived in November, was delivered with deliberate ambiguity. Acting on instructions from the center, the Soviet charge d'affaires ad interim sought an audience with Deputy Premier Kang Jin-tae on November 12. The diplomat delivered a verbal reply from Comrade Kosygin. The Hungarian record explicitly notes the strategic nature of this choice, observing that after "careful consideration," the Soviets decided not to reply in writing.
By denying the DPRK a written document, Moscow avoided creating a record that could be cited as a formal promise or a point of leverage in future negotiations. The verbal message was blunt: the Soviet Union remained unable to deal with the Bukchang thermal power plant extension before 1980 and insisted on maintaining the original terms of the agreement regarding the Kim Chaek components.
COMECON Priority
Kang Jin-tae was "very dissatisfied" with the verbal rejection. The following day, November 13, Minister Gae Eung-tae requested another meeting with the Soviet charge d'affaires. The tone of the conversation shifted from long-term industrial planning to immediate survival. Gae informed the Soviet diplomat that the DPRK was in a "difficult economic situation" and required urgent assistance from socialist allies.
His request was specific: 200,000 metric tons of oil and 150,000 metric tons of coking coal, to be delivered within the calendar year.
To a casual observer, this might seem like a modest plea for help between fraternal states, but the Soviet internal accounting told a different story. The report provides the figures of the existing intergovernmental protocol: the Soviet Union was already supplying the DPRK with slightly more than 1 million metric tons of oil and 1.2 million metric tons of coking coal annually. As of November 1, over 70% of these shipments had been completed, and Moscow intended to fulfill the full amount by year's end without interruption.
The Soviet charge d'affaires acknowledged Gae's request and promised to forward it, but the outlook was bleak. The Soviet diplomat, speaking to the Hungarian embassy, expressed the view that there was "very little likelihood of fulfilling the request."
Moreover, the diplomat indicated a shift in Moscow's long-term strategy toward Pyongyang. He suggested that the Soviet Union would not satisfy "unexpected demands" from North Korea in the future, noting that exceptions would be made only in "very justified cases." The overarching message Moscow sought to convey was one of hierarchy: the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) held priority whenever the Soviet Union decided on unexpected demands.
The report, signed by Ambassador Ferenc Szabo, leaves the final disposition of the oil and coal request unrecorded, noting only the Soviet diplomat's skepticism regarding its fulfillment.