CIA Agents Plotted to Physically Eliminate Patrice Lumumba

By Theo Marchetti · August 16, 2026

Hidden under the Rybat cryptonym, US agents weighed killing Patrice Lumumba as he was squeezed out of power, while one key telegram remains missing.

Patrice Lumumba's fight for Congolese independence ended in a betrayal that cost him his life and destabilized a new nation. In September 1960, while the world watched the First Congolese Republic struggle to breathe, agents in Leopoldville were already weighing the cost of his death.

A telegram dated September 8, 1960, sent from the Station in the Congo to the Central Intelligence Agency, captures a government in the midst of a collapse and a foreign intelligence service accelerating that fall. The record, marked "Secret" and "Rybat," describes a chaotic scene in Leopoldville where the lines between legal authority and military force had vanished. The stakes were absolute: the first prime minister of the republic was being squeezed out of power, and the Americans were not merely watching.

"Physically eliminate Lumumba"

The document records a conversation between the Chief of Station (COS) and an unnamed individual, identified in the text as "Identity 1." The COS noted that Lumumba, even if relegated to the opposition, remained "almost as dangerous as in office." The response from Identity 1 was a chilling piece of shorthand: he indicated he understood the danger and "implied might physically eliminate Lumumba."

This was not a stray comment made in a vacuum. The telegram outlines a concerted effort to dismantle Lumumba's government. The CIA suggested several immediate steps to ensure the ouster held: justifying the move to all African states and members of the Security Council, holding press conferences to sway world opinion, and influencing votes within the parliament. The objective was clear—remove the prime minister and ensure he could not return.

Radio Brazzaville and the 100 Armed Troops

While the official reports of the day suggested a degree of order, the CIA's internal cable tells a different story. The UN claimed that troops at Camp Leopoldville Two had been disarmed and that all weapons and ammunition were under lock. The COS, however, reported that he had "seen 50 to 100 armed troops" in Leopoldville. The city was littered with roadblocks following youth demonstrations, a physical manifestation of the instability the Station was working to manage.

Communication was another battlefield. With Congo Radio off the air, the Station suggested getting opposition leaders on the air via Radio Brazzaville. The goal was to present the opposition to the people and isolate Lumumba. The record shows a desperation to control the narrative, with the Station reporting it was "going all out this crisis" and was "forced take calculated risks" to "pull hat out of fire."

The First Senator

The telegram mentions that the Ambassador shared the view that if the opposition failed, Lumumba would possess "dictatorial power" and that "bloc" interests—a reference to the Soviet sphere—would strongly influence such a government. This geopolitical fear provided the justification for the "calculated risks."

Years later, the record reveals that the chaos of September 1960 was not entirely organic. In a 1967 Agency debriefing, the Chief of Station recalled that he had actually drawn up a "three-page plan, step-by-step-by-step." This plan was not about diplomacy or parliamentary procedure; it began with the most basic form of political leverage: "buying the first senator."

The COS told debriefers that he believed he had thought of everything, from the propaganda to the placement of guards around the airport and the radio station. However, the timeline shifted. President Joseph Kasavubu moved the schedule up by two days, firing Lumumba without waiting for the parliamentary vote that the CIA's plan had presumably anticipated.

September 8, 1960

By the time the telegram was sent on September 8, the pieces were already moving. Ileo, the man intended to replace Lumumba, was missing and had not returned home since the night of Kasavubu's speech on September 5. Mobutu, the army leader, had already signaled his defiance, telling Lumumba that the army would not become involved in "political problems" and would not obey orders to remain ready for Lumumba's use.

Nine ministers of the Lumumba government had already resigned by September 6. The telegram concludes with the Station reporting its full commitment to the crisis, operating under the belief that the U.N. and U.S. positions in the Congo were "undetermined" as long as Lumumba remained.

The record ends there, but the trajectory it established led directly to Lumumba's assassination in 1961. One remaining gap in the archive is noted in the footnotes: a specific CIA telegram, number 49672, which agreed with the Station's aggressive attitude, has never been found.