Right-wing plotters used US name to try to topple Jose Figueres
By Desmond Okafor ·
Right-wing conspirators in Costa Rica claimed the support of Washington to fuel a coup that was kept "Secret/Sensitive" while the US distanced itself from the chaos.
Jose Figueres Ferrer spent the winter of 1971 with a target on his back, hunted by right-wing conspirators who lied about having the backing of the United States. The cost of such delusions is usually measured in blood and the collapse of democratic stability.
In the late months of 1971, a group calling itself the Free Costa Rica Movement (MCRL) began assembling a plan to remove Figueres from power. According to a January 7, 1972, memorandum from Thomas H. Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans at the CIA, to Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Staff, the MCRL consisted of "ever-conspiring Costa Rican rightists." These men did not act alone; they sought and secured a promise of assistance from government officials in Guatemala.
"Ever-conspiring Costa Rican rightists"
The memorandum, marked "Secret/Sensitive," paints a picture of an operation defined more by incompetence than by strategic brilliance. As the CIA monitored the flow of intelligence, the Agency concluded that the plot was "poorly planned" and that the likelihood of success was "almost nil."
There was a cold calculation at play in Washington. The Agency anticipated that an "abortive coup" would not only fail to remove Figueres but would actually strengthen his hand. In the eyes of the CIA, a failed attempt by the right would allow Figueres to "quiet the local opposition," specifically regarding the sensitive issue of the Soviet presence in Costa Rica. The US government was not merely watching a train wreck; it was calculating how the wreckage might serve its own interests in the region.
The January 3 leak
While the CIA viewed the plot with professional disdain, the conspirators were using the prestige of the United States as a weapon of persuasion. In late December, Guatemalan activists began claiming that the CIA and the US Government were supporting the coup. This was not a coordinated strategy directed by Washington, but rather a tactic used by the Guatemalans for "encouragement purposes" to lure more Costa Ricans into the fold.
This desperation for legitimacy led to a fatal lack of security. The memorandum notes that the number of conspirators grew rapidly, though many were of "questionable reliability and discretion." It was only a matter of time before the secret leaked.
That leak occurred on January 3, 1972. The record states that the existence of the plot "surfaced" during a meeting of Costa Rican officials attended by President Figueres himself. The conspirators had tried to build a movement on a lie of American support, and that lie had led them straight into the hands of the man they intended to overthrow.
A "normal exchange" with Ambassador Ploeser
Once the plot was exposed, the US shifted into damage control. The Agency coordinated with the Department of State and the American ambassadors to Costa Rica and Guatemala to manage the fallout. The primary concern was not the stability of the Costa Rican government, but the "allegations of U.S. involvement" and the "past difficulties" the US had experienced with Figueres.
To scrub the American name from the conspiracy, the State Department deployed Ambassador Ploeser. His instructions were precise: he was to meet Figueres and, as part of a "normal exchange," inform him that the US had heard about the plotting.
However, this "normal exchange" was a carefully curated piece of theater. Ploeser was directed to keep the details "very general" and, crucially, to "avoid any reference to Guatemalan support." The goal was to distance Washington from the right-wing elements in Guatemala and to "emphasize that the United States Government had not been a part to any such plotting."
There are gaps in this history. The memorandum contains two sections of text that remain "not declassified," leaving the full nature of the US-Guatemalan dialogue and the specific "past difficulties" with Figueres in the dark. While the CIA was happy to distance itself from a failed coup, the record shows a pattern of allowing the US image to be used as a tool for right-wing agitation, provided the Agency could deny it later.
The memorandum references an Intelligence Information Cable—TCDSDB–315/00090–72—dated January 5, which remains unpublished.