Kim Jong Il promised Albright a "first and last" satellite launch
By Eleanor Voss ·
The North Korean dictator admitted his economy was in ruins and promised an end to satellite launches in a December 2000 exchange that remained hidden for years.
The people of North Korea were starving in the grip of a drought-driven energy collapse while their leader played the role of a cinephile to American diplomats. Kim Jong Il managed the perception of his regime's desperation as a form of "pragmatism" to keep the West guessing about the true state of his fortress state.
The file's catalogue entry records a December 5, 2000, cable from the State Department to the American embassy in Seoul. It details a briefing given by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. The two leaders were comparing notes on their personal impressions of the man who ruled the North—a man whose public image was carefully curated but whose private admissions, according to the record, betrayed a regime on the brink.
"First and last"
According to the archive's description, Albright found the Chairman to be "well-informed and comfortable" across a variety of topics. He played the part of the sophisticated global citizen, expressing an avid interest in computers, e-mail, and the Oscars. He even suggested that the life of President Kim Dae Jung—moving from dissident to exile to president—would make a compelling movie.
But the record suggests this polish was a layer of lacquer over a crumbling house. During a massive cultural event at a stadium, the festivities included a depiction of a Taepodong missile taking off. In an offhand remark to Albright and Ambassador Sherman, Kim Jong Il claimed that this portrayal would be the "first and last" North Korean satellite launch.
For those of us who spent years staring at targeting folders and war-plans, the idea of taking a dictator's "offhand remark" as a strategic commitment is a dangerous gamble. The record notes that Albright viewed this as a sign of pragmatism. In the cold logic of deterrence, a promise made during a dance performance in a stadium is not a treaty; it is a distraction.
Document imagery from nsarchive.gwu.edu From the files: nsarchive.gwu.edu
The Swedish Model
Beneath the talk of cinema and electronics, the Chairman was forced to admit the truth about his country's internals. The catalogue entry states that Kim Jong Il admitted his economy was "in very bad shape," citing critical energy shortages exacerbated by a drought that had crippled hydropower.
When the conversation shifted toward reform, the Chairman revealed a staggering lack of fundamental economic understanding. He told Albright that he had asked Russian President Vladimir Putin what "opening up" actually meant. He expressed a fondness for the "Swedish model" of economic development.
Albright's response, as recorded in the summary, was blunt: she pointed out that the Swedish model was based on an already well-developed economy—something North Korea "clearly did not possess." It is a stark reminder that the regime's desire for the fruits of prosperity was entirely decoupled from any willingness to implement the discipline required to achieve it.
December 5, 2000
President Kim Dae Jung seemed to believe he could leverage this instability. He told the Chairman that for the survival of the North, both in terms of security and economic development, relations with the United States had to improve. He pointed to South Korea's own successful balancing act with the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China as a blueprint for survival.
President Kim believed he had found a pragmatic streak in the dictator, noting that Kim Jong Il had expressed openness to allowing U.S. forces to remain on the peninsula even after a potential reunification. Albright noted that while the Chairman's mood could swing, he remained polite and never showed anger during their meetings.
This is the danger of the "personal impression" in diplomacy. We are encouraged to see the human side—the movie buff, the polite listener, the man who admires a certain European social contract—and mistake it for a shift in strategic intent. The record shows a man who was tense and moody, whose economy was failing, and who was effectively guessing at the meaning of economic liberalization.
The catalogue entry notes that the cable only covers the first part of the meeting between Albright and President Kim. The session eventually adjourned for a smaller group discussion, the details of which were reported in a separate cable that the archive notes is not available.