Nixon Leveraged Nuclear Treaty to Secure Berlin Access
By Roy Castellano ·
Held in the White House Cabinet Room on February 4, 1969, a meeting over Berlin access remained missing from formal minutes until Alexander Haig's handwritten notes surfaced.
The citizens of West Berlin lived under the shadow of a city that could be sealed shut by a Soviet whim. The cost of a miscalculation in the Cabinet Room was the potential isolation of millions from the Western world.
According to an editorial note in the Foreign Relations of the United States (1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972), the Nixon administration spent the morning of February 4, 1969, weighing the risks of holding the Bundesversammlung—the Federal Convention of the German parliament—in Berlin. The Bundestag, the only constitutional body in Germany directly elected by the people, represented a democratic legitimacy the Soviets viewed with perpetual suspicion. To move the convention into the city was to poke the bear.
"Plans are Useless"
President Nixon chaired the meeting from 10:07 to 11:45 a.m. The room was packed with the architects of deterrence: Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, CIA Director Richard Helms, and General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
There are no formal minutes of this meeting. The historical record survives only because Alexander Haig, Kissinger's senior military assistant, took handwritten notes. In them, Nixon sounds less like a diplomat and more like a coach. He told the gathered officials that "plans are useless but planning essential— like broken play in football—it works because we’ve thought about it."
For a man who spent nineteen years in the war-plan archives of Strategic Air Command, this sentiment is the only one that matters. A plan is not a script; it is a mental exercise in contingency. It ensures that when the crisis hits, the decision-makers are not starting from zero. But as the briefing progressed, it became clear that the planning for Berlin had a dangerous hole.
Civilian Access
Colonels Elmer R. Daniels, Jr. and Joseph C. McDonough of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the briefing on Berlin. When Kissinger asked if the existing plans covered both civilian and military access, the response from General McConnell was telling: "We’ve only had this w[ith] military. I’ve seen two— no military plan."
This was the gap. The military could likely force a corridor open or maintain a presence, but the lifeblood of West Berlin was its civilian supply lines. Richard Helms pressed the point, noting that civilian access was "more complex" and asking if the NSC should be looking at it more closely. McConnell suggested that a "Rhine set" might work, though he admitted, "We’ve just never done it."
It is a stark reminder that the most sophisticated military apparatus in history can still overlook the basic logistics of keeping a city fed and fueled. The hardware is the easy part; the politics of civilian corridors is where the real blood is spilled.
A Nuclear Trade
Nixon wanted to know if the Soviets had any indication that the upcoming elections would cause trouble. Helms saw none, but the President was more interested in the leverage. He asked if the U.S. position had been made stronger to the Soviets.
Secretary Rogers provided the answer. He had informed the Soviets the previous day that the crisis over Berlin "could finish NPT."
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was the gold standard of arms control, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Rogers was effectively telling Moscow that if they interfered with the democratic processes of the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin, the United States would walk away from the treaty.
Nixon’s response was brief: "This is useful. Soviets asked if this is a condition."
In the cold calculus of the 1960s, the survival of a nuclear treaty was a fair trade for the security of a city. The administration didn't rely on a formal military plan for civilian aircraft—which McConnell noted had been an issue with the UK—but on the threat of global instability. They used the NPT as a shield for Berlin.
The record does not say if the Soviets blinked, only that the Administration found the threat to the treaty "useful."