CIA Offered Eduardo Frei Cash and Exile to Trigger Chilean Coup
By Harlan Pryce ·
Kept as "Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only," these records show how U.S. officials plotted to buy a military coup in Chile and offered a president's flight into exile to stop a Marxist.
Eduardo Frei and the Chilean military were offered cash and sanctuary in exchange for discarding the ballot box. The price for this stability was the quiet erasure of a democratic transition.
According to a memorandum for the record dated September 22, 1970, the machinery of the American state was working in contradictory directions. On one side, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the Voice of America (VOA) were producing material that CIA Deputy Director for Plans Thomas H. Karamessines noted "could be considered pro-Allende." On the other, the CIA was engaged in "overseas press work" to ensure that American publications of influence swayed the narrative in Latin America.
Karamessines detailed these frictions during an 8:00 a.m. meeting in the office of Dr. Henry Kissinger. The room was crowded with the architects of Cold War policy: CIA Director Richard Helms, Under Secretary of State Irwin, Alexis Johnson, Dave Packard, Tom Moorer, and Pete Vaky. The objective was singular: prevent Salvador Allende—a socialist whom the public record identifies as the first Marxist elected in a liberal democracy in Latin America—from taking power.
A "Dead Duck" in Santiago
By late September 1970, the U.S. intelligence community had concluded that the legal path to power in Chile was a lost cause. Karamessines described the existing "parliamentary contraption" as a "dead duck." The focus shifted from the ballot to the barracks.
The memorandum notes that while Chilean generals were discussing a coup among themselves, they were paralyzed by a lack of a signal. They were waiting for President Eduardo Frei to give them "the word." Ambassador Korry had already signaled to Frei, via an intermediary named Ossa, that the military should move.
There was also a financial dimension to the ideological war. Karamessines flagged a $4 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank destined for a technical university. The CIA viewed the school not as an educational institution but as a "hot bed of Marxism" with a radio station that broadcast "rabidly for Allende." Secretary Johnson promised to look into the loan, treating the bank's financial approvals as tactical errors to be corrected.
The Greek Precedent
Tradecraft is often a matter of managing the fears of your assets. The Chilean military, as Karamessines reported, was hesitant to seize power because they were watching how the United States treated its partners. Specifically, they believed the U.S. attitude toward the Greek Junta suggested that a military government might find its aid and support suddenly withdrawn once the deed was done.
To cure this hesitation, the State Department and the CIA agreed to a two-pronged messaging campaign. First, Alexis Johnson and the State Department would draft a message to Ambassador Korry. This message was to ensure Frei knew he would have U.S. support if he entered an election following a "coup scenario." More importantly, the military was to be told explicitly that "they will continue to receive military help from the U.S. if a military coup takes over."
It was a straightforward transaction: the legitimacy of the Chilean state in exchange for a guaranteed supply of American hardware and funding.
Track II and the Price of Exile
While the official channels through Ambassador Korry were being primed, Karamessines was running a second, more intimate line of communication. In an addendum to the memo, he describes a "Track II" operation involving an operative named George Donohue.
Donohue was dispatched to see Frei and Ossa to reinforce the official promises with concrete, private incentives. The offer was not merely political support, but a direct financial injection. Donohue was instructed to assure Frei that, if necessary, he would receive "twice the amount he had for the 1964 election."
For the man at the top, the U.S. offered a final exit strategy. Donohue was to tell Frei that if the effort to stop Allende failed, the United States would "help Frei to get himself resettled overseas if that is what he chooses to do."
When Karamessines briefed Henry Kissinger on this secondary channel after the main meeting had adjourned, Kissinger's assessment was brief. He told the Deputy Director that the handling of the problem had been "perfect" and urged him to "keep it up."
Other related files on Allende exist in the UK National Archives, including records from the Information Research Department regarding anti-Marxists and the flight of Cuban guerrillas. In the U.S. National Archives, further "Classified Salvador Allende Files" remain under NAID 4530036.
Whether Frei ever seriously considered the offer of resettlement overseas is not recorded in this memorandum. The document ends with the confirmation of Kissinger's approval of the operation, marked "Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only."