CIA Supplied Sterile Guns and Gas Masks to Overthrow Allende
By Harlan Pryce ·
An 'Eyes Only' directive demanded the overthrow of Salvador Allende through clandestine pressure and the delivery of sterile weapons to coup plotters in Santiago.
Salvador Allende’s presidency was marked for termination before he could settle into the Moneda Palace. In October 1970, the cost of his democratic victory was a covert mandate to ensure his overthrow, a decision that placed Chile on a collision course with a military coup.
An "Eyes Only" telegram, dated October 16, 1970, and sent from Washington to the CIA Station in Santiago, leaves no room for ambiguity. The directive establishes the "Track Two" policy: the firm and continuing objective that Allende be overthrown. The urgency was high; the Agency preferred this happen before October 24, though the order was to continue "vigorously" beyond that date. The mandate was simple: generate maximum pressure using every appropriate resource, provided the "American hand be well hidden."
Viaux
Tradecraft is as much about restraint as it is about action. The record shows the Agency managing General René Viaux with the cold patience of a handler who knows when an asset is overreaching. Viaux had plans for a coup, but Washington’s assessment was blunt: a coup attempt carried out by Viaux alone, with his existing forces, "would fail."
In the world of clandestine operations, a premature failure is worse than inaction. A failed coup doesn't just leave the target in power; it burns the assets and "reduce[s] your capabilities for the future." Consequently, the Station was ordered to deliver a carefully worded warning to Viaux. He was to be told that his current plans could not succeed and that he should "preserve your assets."
This was not a withdrawal of support, but a strategic pause. The Agency wanted Viaux to "amplify his planning" and, more importantly, to join forces with other coup planners. The goal was a concerted effort—a synchronized strike that would actually hold—rather than a precipitate action that would only alert the target. This is the discipline of the service: ensuring the blow is fatal before it is struck.
Sterile .45s and CS Gas
While the diplomatic cables may have spoken of stability, the operational cables spoke of hardware. The October 16 telegram notes that six gas masks and six CS canisters were being transported to Santiago by a special courier, though the specifics of this transport are obscured by a redaction covering less than one line of text.
But the canisters were only the beginning. A footnote in the record details a subsequent request from the Santiago Station on October 18. The Station asked for "8 to 10 more grenades, three sterile 45 caliber machine guns, and 500 rounds of ammunition" for a group led by a man named Valenzuela.
In this context, "sterile" is the operative word. Sterile weapons are those without traceable markings, stripped of any link to their origin. They are the essential tools of a deniable operation. If a sterile .45 is found in the hands of a plotter, it tells the world nothing about who provided it. It allows the U.S. government to maintain its distance while providing the lethal means for the objective. The Agency authorized these weapons the same day they were requested.
Santiago's Orders
There is a recurring tension in these records between the professional intelligence officer and the diplomatic bureaucrat. The telegram explicitly warns the Station to ignore any one-off guidance they might receive from the State Department or its "maximum exponent in Santiago."
Operational guidance was to supersede diplomatic niceties. The Station was told to employ every tool in the arsenal: propaganda, black operations, the "surfacing of intelligence or disinformation," and "anything else your imagination can conjure." The only caveat was security. The objective—itself partially obscured by a redaction of less than one line—was to be pursued in a manner that kept the U.S. government's involvement invisible.
This level of autonomy is rare and dangerous, but it reflects a high-level decision that the political risk of Allende's presidency outweighed the risk of a clandestine operation gone wrong. The Agency was not merely observing a foreign election; it was actively sculpting the political landscape of Chile through the use of untraceable arms and managed instability.
The record shows that the sterile guns and ammunition were delivered to the coup plotters on October 21.