Colonel-General Babadzhanyan Calculated 50 Nukes to Kill Half the US
By Roy Castellano ·
Soviet planners weighed the annihilation of US cities and the Ruhr valley in a TOP SECRET journal kept from the West for decades, though some sources remain blacked out.
Half the population of the United States would die if fifty nuclear weapons hit their targets. In the Ruhr valley, a few bombs would annihilate the labor force and leave the industrial heart of Europe a graveyard.
These were not the fever dreams of a fringe extremist, but the calculated estimates of Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan. According to OCR-extracted text from the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, Babadzhanyan outlined these projections in a 1961 article titled "The Nature of Modern Warfare." The piece appeared in Voyennaya mysl (Military Thought), a journal published by the Soviet Ministry of Defense and distributed only to the level of Army Commander.
The document—a verbatim translation delivered via a memorandum from Richard Helms to the Director of Central Intelligence on January 8, 1962—shows the CIA was meticulously tracking the internal intellectual frictions of the Soviet high command. The memo warns that the material should be handled on a "need-to-know basis" to protect the source, a figure identified only as "a reliable source (B)."
170 Urban Areas
Babadzhanyan’s analysis begins with the physics of the megaton. He describes a 10-megaton bomb as capable of destroying municipal and industrial structures over an area of 11,300 square kilometers. The human cost is mapped with clinical precision. Under average wind velocities, Babadzhanyan estimated that all persons in a zone of 170 by 30 kilometers would perish from radiation sickness, while another 10,000 square kilometers would see 50 percent mortality.
When applying these figures to the United States, the Soviet general noted that American specialists themselves estimated 50 nuclear weapons could kill half the total US population. Babadzhanyan expanded this logic, noting that the US had "a total of 170 urban areas" where population and industry were concentrated. He concluded that the use of 120 to 165 nuclear weapons across the US territory would "knock out up to three fourths of the industry."
This was not merely a study in destruction, but a study in systemic collapse. Babadzhanyan argued that because of the "high degree of industrial cooperation" required for military equipment, such a blow would halt all production, making the demise of the US army "only a matter of time."
"Laid it on thick"
The article records a sharp ideological divide within the Soviet military. Babadzhanyan spent considerable time critiquing his colleagues, specifically Generals Gastilovich, Tolkonyuk, and Baskakov. He accused them of having "laid it on thick," suggesting their theories on the nature of future war were exaggerated.
While Gastilovich argued that Soviet military doctrine required a fundamental review and was perhaps in a state of "crisis," Babadzhanyan aligned himself with General of the Army Kurochkin. The debate centered on whether the mass use of thermonuclear weapons rendered traditional military art obsolete. Gastilovich believed that ground troops in a nuclear war would serve primarily for "occupation," requiring only 30 to 40 divisions in the Western Theater of Military Operations to seize territory already broken by megaton bombs.
Babadzhanyan rejected this optimism. He argued that the "radiological factor" and the necessity of replacing units knocked out by nuclear strikes meant that "more massive armed forces will be needed." He also dismissed the idea that the distinction between offensive and defensive operations had been erased. To Babadzhanyan, a stable defense remained essential, though he admitted that "linear" stability—holding a specific line—was impossible. Instead, he proposed a stability of "depth," where the enemy would be halted by a system of massed nuclear counterstrikes within a specific sector of territory.
Ruble Costs and Heavy Tanks
Beyond the nuclear calculus, Babadzhanyan used the document to argue for a total overhaul of Soviet armored doctrine. He claimed the era of the heavy tank was over, rendered obsolete by the development of anti-tank missile launchers.
His reasoning was as much about the treasury as it was about the battlefield. Babadzhanyan noted that while an anti-tank missile launcher cost "several tens of thousands of rubles," a tank cost "several hundreds of thousands of rubles." In a head-to-head fight, he asserted the tank would "usually lose," making the current concept of tank warfare "unprofitable both militarily and economically."
He proposed replacing heavy tanks with light combat vehicles armed with automatic multi-round missile launchers and splinter-proof armor. He specifically suggested the amphibious tank, PT-76, as the basis for this new vehicle, emphasizing the need for troops to cover great distances on their own power.
Throughout the record, the CIA’s processing of the text is marked by gaps. Several paragraphs and specific identifiers are obscured by redactions labeled 1.3(a)(4) and 12(a)(4), particularly in the sections discussing the distribution list—which included the National Security Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission—and the specifics of the source's handling. The identity of the "reliable source (B)" who smuggled these TOP SECRET Soviet deliberations into the hands of Richard Helms remains blacked out.