Russian Submarines Nearly Triggered Catastrophe in 1993
By Roy Castellano ·
Sailors nearly died in a 1993 submarine collision and a report on biological warfare remains blacked out, according to records of a 1994 summit.
Sailing blind in the lightless depths, Russian and American submarine crews nearly triggered a nuclear catastrophe in the waters of 1993. The cost of these collisions was measured in shredded hulls and the sudden, terrifying realization that a world war could start by accident.
These encounters occurred during a period of profound instability, as the Russian Federation attempted to navigate the wreckage of the Soviet Union. By the time President Boris Yeltsin arrived in Washington for a state visit in September 1994, the relationship between the two superpowers was a volatile mix of hope and deep-seated suspicion. Yeltsin, a former member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who had pivoted toward an independent political identity, sought to project the image of a modern, transparent leader. Yet, as the archival records show, the transparency was a facade.
"Drag around one of these briefcases"
The file's catalogue entry records that during an expanded session on security issues on September 27, 1994, the two presidents covered everything from economic reform to the extraction of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. In a moment that likely startled U.S. officials, Yeltsin proposed a radical departure from the protocols of nuclear command: he wanted to get "rid of the nuclear footballs."
To Yeltsin, the briefcase containing the launch codes—the symbol of the ultimate authority of the state—had become an absurdity. The catalogue entry notes that, given the advanced state of communications available in the mid-1990s, Yeltsin saw no logical reason to have an aide "drag around one of these briefcases." It was a proposal that suggested a desire to dismantle the very psychological architecture of the Cold War, treating the most dangerous tool in human history as a mere clerical inconvenience.
Document imagery from nsarchive.gwu.edu From the files: nsarchive.gwu.edu
"States to the south"
While Yeltsin played the part of the reformer, his defense establishment remained tethered to the hard realities of geography and deterrence. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev provided a sharp counterpoint to the president's optimism. As Grachev summarized the progress in dismantling nuclear missiles, he drew a hard line regarding tactical nuclear weapons.
Unlike the United States, which had moved to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from its overseas deployments, Grachev insisted that Russia "cannot destroy all tactical nuclear weapons." The rationale was not ideological but strategic. According to the archive's description, Grachev argued that "within reasonable bounds we need some" as a means of deterring potential aggression from "states to the south."
This reference to the south speaks to the fragility of the post-Soviet periphery. In 1994, the Russian military was watching the volatile borders of the Caucasus and Central Asia with apprehension. For Grachev, the "football" might have been a nuisance, but tactical warheads were a necessary hedge against the chaos of a collapsing empire. The defense minister was not interested in the aesthetics of diplomacy; he was interested in the survival of the state.
September 28, 1994
The tension of the era was most visceral when Grachev raised the issue of submarine patrolling zones. He warned that "some submarines have entered our territorial waters and we almost had a catastrophe." This was a direct reference to a series of collisions between U.S. and Russian vessels, including a particularly dangerous encounter in March 1993. These incidents were not merely navigational errors; they were the result of two massive naval forces continuing to hunt one another in the dark, even as their political leaders shook hands in Vancouver and Washington.
However, the most significant gap in the record appears at the end of the summit. During the September 27 meeting, Yeltsin mentioned that the Russians had finally presented a "long-awaited paper" regarding their biological weapons activities. This was a critical admission, as the Soviet biological warfare program had been one of the most clandestine and lethal projects of the twentieth century.
While the presidents agreed to discuss submarine zones at their next meeting, the biological weapons issue entered a void. The archive's curated description is explicit: the paper on biological weapons activities, and the entire record of the subsequent discussion held on September 28, remains classified.
We are left with a stark contradiction. On one hand, a president suggesting that the nuclear football was an outdated accessory; on the other, a defense minister clinging to tactical nukes to ward off southern neighbors and a government withholding the details of its biological arsenal. The paper on biological warfare remains blacked out, and the record of the September 28 discussion has not been released.