Soviet Navy Positioned 12 Cruise Missiles Against US Carriers in 1968

By Roy Castellano · August 20, 2026

US sailors faced a growing Soviet anticarrier force that stayed hidden in plain sight for decades; the full report remained secret until 2017.

The crews of the US Sixth Fleet operated under the shadow of a threat they could not always see. For years, Soviet cruise missiles and nuclear submarines crept closer to American carriers, turning the Mediterranean into a calculated gamble of brinkmanship.

According to an intelligence report from December 1968, released via the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron had evolved from a handful of ships in 1964 into the largest naval force the USSR regularly deployed outside its own home waters. By late 1968, the force had reached a point where the CIA termed it a "credible threat to the US Sixth Fleet."

June 1967

Until the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, the squadron followed a predictable, seasonal rhythm. Deployments were small, and ships typically stayed less than two months. The war broke that pattern. As tensions spiked in May, the Soviets diverted two nuclear-powered submarines—one for torpedo attacks and one for cruise missiles—from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

This move fundamentally changed the math of the region. The deployment of the cruise missile unit spiked the number of launchers in the squadron from three to eleven. The report notes that these increased anticarrier capabilities were intended as a "reminder to the US and others that Soviet interests must be reckoned with in any military moves in the Middle East."

By late June, the Soviets had quadrupled the size of their surface combatant force. They divided the squadron into three groups specifically to monitor the movements of two US and one British attack carrier. This was no longer a defensive perimeter; it was a projection of power designed to make the US pause before intervening in future crises.

Egyptian Markings

While the ships provided the muscle, the Soviets used deception to provide the eyes. In April 1968, six TU-16 Badger medium bombers were flown to Egypt. By August, these aircraft were flying reconnaissance missions against Sixth Fleet formations, but they did not carry Soviet insignia. Instead, they wore "Egyptian markings."

This masquerade served a dual purpose. Militarily, it gave the squadron the air reconnaissance it had previously lacked. Politically, it reinforced the image of the USSR as the "defender of Arab interests." The report suggests that the presence of amphibious ships, such as the Poinocny and Alligator classes, was intended to signal a willingness to put boots on the ground, potentially committing 400 to 600 troops to support client states.

A Lack of Refrigerators

For all the talk of "credible threats," the Soviet machine was running on fumes. The report exposes a glaring weakness in the Soviet naval logistics force: they simply could not feed or maintain their ships in a prolonged fight.

The USSR lacked naval refrigerator ships, ammunition ships, and dry stores ships. Their oilers were described as "small, slow, and few in number." Some of the older warships were so poorly equipped they could not produce their own fresh water or boiler feed water and required constant resupply from water carriers.

To keep the squadron afloat, Moscow resorted to improvisations. They utilized merchant tankers and secured an oil storage facility in Port Said. They also assumed managerial control of a ship construction and repair facility in Alexandria. However, the analysts were blunt: these arrangements "have not, however, provided a logistics capability adequate to support the squadron in the event of extended hostilities."

The Polaris Problem

Despite their gains against aircraft carriers, the Soviets remained blind to the most dangerous threat in the water. The report identifies Polaris submarines as the chief strategic danger to the USSR in the Mediterranean, noting that Soviet capabilities against them remained "poor."

To bridge this gap, the Soviets began deploying the Moskva-class helicopter carrier and BE-12 Mail antisubmarine patrol planes based in Egypt. The goal was to transform the Mediterranean from a safe haven for American nuclear submarines into a hostile environment.

The report concludes by looking toward the next year, noting that the deployment of new nuclear-powered attack submarines and Kresta-class guided missile ships would likely be the next step in the effort to push Polaris patrols out of the Mediterranean entirely.