The divide between the generals and the spies was codified in 1994, ensuring the Pentagon ran its counterterrorism fight in a vacuum while the intelligence community stayed on the sidelines.
By Harlan Pryce ·
A formal statement to Congress in March 2000 codified the shift toward preemptive strikes and the use of rapid response teams, while masking the kinetic operations they supported.
By Desmond Okafor ·
American operatives fought over who had the right to snatch suspects from foreign soil while the government ignored the possibility of no-warning attacks in its 1999 preparations.
By Desmond Okafor ·
From the ruins of African embassies to the planning of an Alabama training center, a 1999 report hides a systemic failure to disrupt al-Qaeda before the 2001 attacks
By Desmond Okafor ·
In 1999, an audit of 201 federal drills found a systemic failure to prepare for no-notice attacks and conventional weapons, leaving a gap in readiness that persisted until 2001.
By Harlan Pryce ·
While the FBI warned that conventional weapons remained the primary terrorist threat, the Pentagon spent millions building a response machine for a chemical apocalypse that intelligence said wasn't coming.
By Harlan Pryce ·
Kept under a 'NODIS' restriction, a 1999 cable shows U.S. officials negotiating with a protector of Arab militants while the man who would orchestrate 9/11 remained in place
By Desmond Okafor ·
Vladimir Putin secured American approval for Chechen operations by citing a 'Terrorist International' as Bill Clinton pushed for Russia to join NATO.
By Harlan Pryce ·
Intelligence warnings blinked red and a money trail led to California, yet American officials failed to synthesize the signals before the Planes Operation.
By Harlan Pryce ·